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Abstract
Sex offender commitment laws present courts with a difficult choice: either allow creative efforts to prevent
sexual violence or enforce traditional constitutional safeguards constraining the power of the state to deprive
citizens of their Iiberty. Three state supreme courts have deflected this hard choice while upholding sex
offender commitment schemes. As part of their ""official narrative"" that legitimizes sex offender
commitments, the courts claim that society can have prevention and still maintain the primacy of the criminal
justice system. This narrative neutralizes the conflict in values by claiming that sex offender commitments are
just like mental illness commitments, a small, discrete area of the law unprotected by the safeguards of
criminal procedure. This article shows the dissolution of the values reconciliation in these official narratives
when courts confront concrete cases and the intense public pressure to lock up sex criminals. Part I of this
article explains that sex offender commitments need to be legitimized because they appear to encroach on
fundamental American legal values. Part II describes the official narrative that three state supreme courts have
developed to justify sex offender commitments. Part III of the article examines the violent public and political
reaction to one attempt to implement the legal limitations actually contained in, but never before followed, in
Minnesota's official narrative. Part IV uses the corpus of sex offender commitment cases in Minnesota to show
that the official narrative is reduced to a ""legal fiction"" when the lower courts confront actual cases where the
conflict in values must be concretely resolved. Part V argues that the clashing values are too important to be
resolved with a false reconciliation. It recommends that courts reviewing sex offender commitment schemes
understand how they are actually administered in concrete cases and concludes that the official narrative of
sex offender commitments is, to a material degree, fiction.
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·Sex Offender Commitments: 
Debunking the Official Narrative 
and Revealing the Rules-in-Use 
Blossoming during the 
heyday of psychiatric "fix 
everything" optimism, the idea of 
committing sex offenders to 
mental hospitals to be "cured" 
appeared to have failed and died 
by the 1980s.1 But reports of its 
demise were premature. Like 
cicadas, insects that lie dormant for 
years between plague-like 
onslaughts, civil commitment for 
"mentally disordered" sex 
offenders is back. It has returned 
in a more robust, and potentially 
more dangerous, form. Whereas 
the main thrust of the first 
generation sex offender 
commitment statutes was to divert 
certain sex offenders from prisons 
to hospitals in order to treat in a 
humane manner those too sick to 
deserve punishment,2 the second 
by 
Eric S. Janus 
Sex offender 
commitment laws 
present courts with a 
difficult choice: either 
allow creative efforts to 
prevent sexual violence 
or enforce traditional 
constitutional 
safeguards constraining 
the power of the state to 
deprive citizens of their 
liberty. 
generation statutes assert the right 
to use civil incarceration after and 
in addition to criminal 
punishmenf to contain those who 
are "too dangerous" to be released 
from prison. 4 
These second generation 
lawss are rooted in the legitimate 
governmental interest in 
preventing sexual violence.. They 
claim to be civil rather than 
criminal, regulatory rather than 
punitive. 6 Thus, these statutes 
claim to be exempt from key 
constraints imposed by the 
constitution on criminal law 
interventions, such as the 
prohibitions against double 
jeopardy? and ex post facto laws,S 
the right to a trial by jury,9 and the 
right to insist upon the highest 
standard of proof.1o Furthermore, 
they appear to contravene the 
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prohibitions against criminalizing 
a status 11 as well as those against basing criminal 
conviction on predicted, rather than committed, crimes.12 
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This claim of exemption is not an incidental aspect 
of sex offender commitment schemes, but rather the very 
basis courts use to legitimize their existence. These laws 
have developed, often in the white light of intense media 
and political activity, to deal with the impediments 
created by criminal constitutional protections.13 The 
explicit purpose of sex offender commitment laws is to 
7J 
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prevent the release of sex offenders from prison when 
they have completed their prison sentences. 
Thus, these laws place two important objectives in 
conflict: preventing sexual violence and protecting basic 
constitutional rights. Powerful stories of sexual violence, 
told and re-told, create a legitimate and long-overdue 
mandate to prevent sexual violence. 14 In conflict are the 
'''great safeguards which the law adopts [to protect 
individuals] in the punishment of crime and the upholding 
of justice. ",IS The prevention mandate seeks to avoid 
these very safeguards. 
Sex offender commitment laws present courts with a 
difficult choice: either allow creative efforts to prevent 
sexual violence or enforce traditional constitutional 
safeguards constraining the power of the state to deprive 
citizens of their Iiberty.16 Three state supreme courts have 
deflected this hard choice while upholding sex offender 
commitment schemes. 17 As part of their "official 
narrative" that legitimizes sex offender commitments, the 
courts claim that society can have prevention and still 
maintain the primacy of the criminal justice system. This 
narrative neutralizes the conflict in values by claiming 
that sex offender commitments are just like mental illness 
commitments, a small, discrete area of the law 
unprotected by the safeguards of criminal procedure. 
This article shows the dissolution of the values-
reconciliation in these official narratives when courts 
confront concrete cases and the intense public pressure to 
lock up sex criminals. 
Part I of this article explains that sex offender 
commitments need to be legitimized because they appear 
to encroach on fundamental American legal values. Part 
II describes the official narrative that three state supreme 
courts have developed to justify sex offender 
commitments. Part III of the article examines the violent 
public and political reaction to one attempt to implement 
the legal limitations actually contained in, but never 
before followed, in Minnesota's official narrative. Part 
IV uses the corpus of sex offender commitment cases in 
Minnesota to show that the official narrative is reduced to 
a "legal fiction" when the lower courts confront actual 
cases where the conflict in values must be concretely 
resolved. 18 Part V argues that the clashing values are too 
important to be resolved with a false reconciliation. It 
recommends that courts reviewing sex offender 
commitment schemes understand how they are actually 
administered in concrete cases and concludes that the 
official narrative of sex offender commitments is, to a 
material degree, fiction. 
I. THE NEED FOR LEGITIMIZATION OF SEX 
OFFENDER COMMITMENTS 
Sex offender commitment!) push the boundaries of 
72 
standard civil commitment. 19 They use preventive 
detention to accomplish purposes that hitherto have been 
reserved exclusively for criminal law. Contemporary sex 
offender commitment laws are, by statutory definition, 
designed to prevent "crimes."20 
The fundamental constitutional legitimacy of 
standard civil commitment laws has been, for the most 
part, assumed rather than proven.21 But sex offender 
cOmniitment laws are different. The questionable 
constitutionality of their inadequately defined limits 
demands special justification or legitimization. In 
contrast to years of jurisprudential silence on the 
substantive limits of standard civil commitment,22 the 
advent of second generation sex offender commitment 
laws has spawned a spate of cases directly addressing the 
perimeters of their constitutionality.23 
Sex offender commitment schemes were enacted 
precisely because standard civil commitment laws were 
not broad enough to cover sex offenders.24 The targets of 
sex offender commitments do not appear to be "crazy" or 
"mentally ill," at least not in the sense traditionally 
required for standard civil commitment.2s Furthermore, 
the societal motivations for sex offender commitments 
appear to differ from those underlying standard civil 
commitments. For instance, many standard civil 
commitments are based on the parens patriae power of the 
state and thus have a rather benign flavor to them: people 
who are too ill to make their own decisions, and whose 
illnesses are so serious as to be potentially harmful, are 
protected by society from themselves and often given 
significantly therapeutic services.26 The other key use of 
civil commitment has been to protect the public from 
dangerous individuals, a use based on the police power of 
the state. This use has been explicitly approved in a 
series of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.27 The 
most obvious context for these cases has been the use of 
civil commitment to incarcerate insanity acquitees-those 
whose mental illness was so severe as to render them non-
responsible for crimes they had committed--as well as 
those deemed incompetent to stand tria1.28 
Sex offender commitments depart from these 
paradigms. They do not arise out of a benign, parens 
patriae, motive.29 The subjects of sex offender 
commitments are not incompetent to make decisions 
about their own mental health treatment.30 And they have 
not been found incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by 
reason of insanity. 31 
Sex offender commitments possess many of the 
qualities that elicit condemnation of "preventive 
detention.'>32 Most centrally, unlike standard civil 
commitments, sex offender commitments are aimed 
directly at those guilty of criminal acts,33 and are 
explicitly intended to circumvent the traditional strict 
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW 
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constitutional limitations on the state's power to 
incarcerate.34 In addition, though courts may categorize 
them as "civil commitment as usual,'~. sex offender 
commitments are well outside the traditional boundaries 
for standard civil commitment. For these reasons, sex 
offender commitment schemes need special justification 
or legitimization. 
II. THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVES AND 
ESPOUSED RULES OF SEX OFFENDER 
COMMITMENTS AS ILLUSTRATED BY 
THREE STATE SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS 
Sex offender commitment laws are the 
crystallization of a particular set of stories about sexual 
violence.3s Some of these stories, or narratives, are 
"private;" they are the stories of individuals who have 
been victimized by sex offenders and the stories of sex 
offenders whose lives have been caught in the web of 
these new laws.36 Some of the narratives have become 
public. These are the narratives that come to represent 
the reasons for having a law, or its effects, or its legal and 
ethical issues, or its justifications. Of these public stories, 
some have been officially adopted, by legislatures or by 
courts, to explain and justify the laws. These narratives 
are the "official narratives" of the sex offender 
commitment laws.37 
The stories evolve as they move from the realm of 
the news media and the legislature to the appellate 
courtroom. While the most salient stories in the early 
stages of the development of sex offender commitment 
laws were stories of sexual violence and pain,l8 the 
official narrative contains other strands. These seek to 
reassure the legal community and the broader public that 
this form of preventive detention is legitimate and that the 
adoption of sex offender commitment laws does not mean 
a retreat from the fundamental constitutional protections 
of the criminal law. 39 
Inherent in the notion of an "official narrative" is a 
claim to be telling the truth. In the sex offender 
commitment context, the official narrative concerns a 
legal proceeding governed by law. Thus, the official 
narrative implies the existence of a set of rules that 
translate the official narrative into courtroom practices. I 
will call these the "espoused rules" of sex offender 
commitments. These are the rules that the courts claim to 
be applying.40 
The rules the courts actually use to decide sex 
offender commitment cases--the "rules-in-use"- reflect 
the real patterns of decisions and may be quite different 
from the espoused rules. These departures may be 
intentional or entirely unconscious.41 To the extent that 
the rules-in-use depart materially and consistently from 
VOLUME 8:21997 
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the official narrative and the espoused rules, the official 
narrative becomes fiction, not truth.42 It is fiction in the 
sense that the courts tell one story and act another. The 
true nature of sex offender commitments, reflected in the 
rules-in-use, remains invisible and untold.43 
As with any narrative, the most important points 
may be made through subtle hints that evoke a particular 
set of themes or emotions. The most powerful point of 
the story may, indeed, be a counterpoint to the explicit 
subject matter of the story. In the sex offender 
commitment context, the official narrative hews to such a 
theme, deftly expressed as an ethos or emotional tone to 
the stories. It is communicated as much by the manner in 
which the courts tell the story of the legitimacy of sex 
offender commitments as by the explicit terms of the 
story itself. 
Supreme courts in three states have upheld sex 
offender commitment laws: Washington,44 Minnesota, 45 
and Wisconsin.46 The narratives spun by these courts are 
deceptively simple. They intend to comfort their readers 
by reframing the potentially frightening story of 
unprincipled "psychiatric" preventive detention47 into a 
familiar and safe story: Sex offender commitments are 
really nothing more than the ubiquitous and limited 
standard civil commitment. But this simple story is not 
persuasive. At key points in each of their narratives, the 
three courts -invoke the "principle of criminal 
interstitiality,,48 to dispel doubts that sex offender 
commitment laws are truly legitimate. 
A. MENTAL DISORDER, NOT VIOLENCE, IS THE LEAD 
CHARACTER OF THE NARRATIVE 
The narratives spun by each of these courts in 
justifying sex offender commitments contain the same 
elements. Each of the narratives begins with the stories of 
sexual violence that have generated sex offender 
commitment laws.49 Each of the courts identifies the past 
crimes committed by the defendants and the predictions 
that sexual violence is highly likely to recur.so Each court 
identifies the state interest in protecting citizens against 
this violence, and each characterizes this interest as a 
"compelling" state interest.SI 
Thus far, the narrative is not new. It is the same 
story that led to the enactment of these laws. But here the 
official narrative introduces a new theme: mental 
disorder. Rhetorically and legally, it seems, the story of 
violence and protective response is no longer persuasive. 
It is not immediately clear why this should be so. 
The story of violence sufficed to persuade legislators that 
creative approaches to prevention were warranted. 
Legally, due process simply requires that the state 
narrowly tailor its actions to meet a compelling state 
interest, a characterization clearly applicable to focused 
73 
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protections against sexual violence.52 Why do the 
supreme courts' narratives need to add mental disorder as 
a significant element of the story to legitimize sex 
offender commitments? All three courts assume, with 
varying degrees of explicitness, that dangerousness 
"alone" is insufficient to justify preventive detention.53 
The role of "mental disorder" in the narrative is to offer 
assurances that the use of preventive detention in sex 
offender commitments is "safely" circumscribed. 
Note that the courts could have assigned this 
boundary-setting role to the "violence" element of the 
stories. The limitation on the use of preventive detention 
could have been accomplished by restricting sex offender 
commitments to the "most dangerous" sex criminals.54 
The fact that "mental disorder" was chosen over violence 
for this role increases the dramatic tension to discover 
how "mental disorder" legitimizes sex offender 
commitments. 
The "mental disorder" element must accomplish two 
tasks. First, it must offer reassurance that th~ use of 
preventive detention for sex offenders is principled and 
does not represent an uncontrolled breach in the hitherto 
high wall around the use of preventive detention.55 
Robert F. Schopp and Barbara J. Sturgis describe this as 
the discriminative role for mental disorder.56 Second, it 
must explain why the preventive detention of sex 
offenders is justified.57 
Without explicitly saying so, all three courts engage 
in this analysis. The courts begin with a mechanical 
argument by analogy. Sex offender commitments are 
''just like" standard civil commitments.58 Both forms of 
civil commitment ("standard" and sex offender) are based 
on a simple three-part formula: past acts plus mental 
disorder plus predicted future harm.59 Though most 
standard civil commitment statutes require a form of 
"mental illness," and the sex offender commitment 
statutes require a showing of "psychopathic personality,,60 
or "mental abnormalities" or "mental disorder" or 
"personality disorder,"6! these differences are initially 
dismissed by the courts as mere semantics. The U.S. 
Supreme Court, they accurately observe, has used a 
variety of terms to describe the mental status predicate to 
civil commitment.62 One form of "mental condition" is 
just as good as another for legitimizing sex offender 
commitments. 
B. GENERAL ASSURANCES ABOUT "MENTAL 
DISORDER" 
This simple analogy is unpersuasive. New 
commitment laws were needed for sex offenders precisely 
because the mental disorders of sex offenders fell outside 
of those cognizable in standard civil commitment cases.63 
An analogy asserts that two things are so similar that the 
74 
known qualities of the first can be attributed to the 
second. All analogies express an implicit judgment about 
which aspects of the two things are significant. If the 
ways in which the things are alike are significant, then the 
analogy works.64 Thus, the narrative must demonstrate 
that despite the differences, the mental disorders in sex 
offender commitment provide a basis for limiting 
preventive detention and for justifying its use that is as 
"real" as that which delineates the mental illnesses of 
standard civil commitments. 
Further, the attempt to extend the coverage of civil 
commitment by expanding the term "mental disorder" 
triggers an underlying skepticism in American culture 
about the basic validity of psychiatry and its potential for 
manipUlation and misuse.~5 To be persuasive, the story 
about the mental disorder element has to neutralize the 
charge that psychiatric categories are manipulable and 
unreliable.66 Thus, each of the courts attempts to establish 
that the mental disorder element is a defmite and limited 
one.67 
Neither of these assurances is particularly 
convmcmg. The courts, for example, cannot seem to 
decide what significance to give the medical definitions 
of "mental disorder." At times they claim the term 
"mental disorder" is a legal, not a medical one, but at 
times they cite medical authority.68 The Wisconsin 
court's explanation merely replaces one rather opaque 
concept, "disorder," with several others: "normality," 
"pathology," and "clinically significant.,,69 The 
Minnesota court characterizes its statute as requiring a 
"volitional dysfunction" which it suggests, without 
authority, is somehow comparable to the standard civil 
commitment definition of "mental iIIness."7o But the 
court offers no explanation for what a "volitional 
dysfunction" is,7! and seems to throw up its hands at the 
complexity of the subject and simply assert its 
conclusion: "Whatever the explanation or label, the 
'psychopathic personality' is an identifiable and 
documentable violent sexually deviant condition or 
disorder.'>12 The Washington Supreme Court argues that 
the "reality" of "personality disorders" is attested to by its 
inclusion in the official nomenclature of the American 
Psychiatric Association, and that the reality of "mental 
abnormality," which is not included, can be ascertained 
from the "good faith" testimony of mental health 
professionals.73 
These discussions should be viewed critically, with 
some measure of skepticism. There is a large and 
sophisticated body of literature on the issues surrounding 
the "reality" of various mental disorders,74 and none of 
the courts cite this literature or give the faintest 
acknowledgment of the density or complexity of the 
issues. The point of this article, however, is not to 
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critique the official narrative generated by the courts, but 
rather to understand it and articulate its rhetorical 
structure. These discussions must be seen as 
acknowledgments by the courts of the need for a 
principled and usable limitation on preventive detention. 
The courts' narrative endorses the proposition that 
"mental disorder" must perform a discriminative role7s if 
sex offender commitments are to be legitimate.76 
Even if the courts' attempts to establish the "reality" 
of the mental disorder elements were sound, the 
fundamental analogy would still be unpersuasive. Merely 
knowing that sex offender commitment statutes 
discriminate based on a "real condition" is insufficient to 
provide a justification for the discrimination.77 That is, 
the narrative needs to explain why the State may use 
preventive detention against a sexual offender with a 
"mental disorder" while it could not use the same 
technique against a person without such a "disorder." 
c. "CRIMINAL INTERSTITIALITY" AS THE KEY 
LEGITIMIZING PRINCIPLE 
The official narrative for sex offender commitments 
invokes a particular legitimizing principle, which this 
article will refer to as "criminal interstitiality." Simply 
put, criminal interstitiality ensures legitimacy by 
maintaining the primacy and ubiquity of the criminal 
justice system. The boundaries of civil (non-criminal) 
confinement are defined in terms of the boundaries of the 
criminal justice system. Civil commitment is permitted to 
reach only where the criminal justice system cannot 
reach.78 Under this principle, civil commitment is 
interstitial to the criminal law in two senses: criminal law 
is the primary and ubiquitous system for addressing 
public health and safety issues through the deprivation of 
liberty. Criminal law remains primary in the sense that it 
is first in line to be used and is by-passed only when its 
inherent substantive limitations prevent its operation. It 
remains ubiquitous in the sense that the "secondary" 
systems take up only a small--and well-
bounded--fraction of the work.79 Thus, the principle of 
criminal interstitiality permits criminal law to remain the 
primary tool for the State to curtail liberty as a means of 
controlling antisocial, violent behavior, while legitimizing 
sex offender cOqImitments in defined circumstances 
beyond the limits of criminal law . 
There are deeply entrenched and socially approved 
boundaries for our criminal law.so The criminal law 
maintains a sense of morals1 (and constitutional) force in 
our society for two reasons. First, it imposes the ultimate 
interventions (deprivation of liberty and life) only under 
stringent procedural conditions. This fundamental 
compact--stringent rules for ultimate sanctions-is 
threatened to the extent the State can utilize the same 
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interventions (deprivation of liberty) without abiding by 
the same stringent limitations. Second, criminal law 
addresses only "actions" for which persons are 
"responsible" because they have a non-excused criminal 
intent. S2 Behaviors that fall outside of these categories are 
not proper subjects for criminal sanctions.s3 
Thus, there are two types of human behaviors that 
are beyond the reach of criminal law. Some behaviors 
cannot be subject to its reach because of the operation of 
stringent procedural rules. Others are beyond its reach 
because of the operation of "substantive" rules about 
"actions" and "responsibility." For simplicity here, this 
article will refer to the latter, substantive category as the 
mental state rules of the criminal law. The principle of 
interstitiality holds that the state may use the civil system 
of incapacitation to protect itself, but only against 
behavior that it is otherwise incapable of reaching 
because of the inherent limitations imposed by the 
substantive mental state rules of the criminal law . 
The principle of interstitiality preserves the moral 
force of the criminal law because it retains the basic 
compact underlying the criminal law: stringent procedural 
safeguards for ultimate interventions. It does not permit 
lesser procedural protections merely because the stringent 
protections have some bite and occasionally result in 
unpopular outcomes. But it does allow the State to use an 
alternative system when the criminal law is substantively 
disabled from addressing the harm posed by a potentially 
dangerous individual. S4 
The principle of interstitiality, if adopted as a 
limiting principle for civil commitment, is strongly 
legitimizing.ss It has a solid scholarly pedigree.86 It puts 
a categorical cap on preventive detention, providing a 
principled boundary which ensures that preventive 
detention will not swallow the criminal justice system. 
Finally, the principle of criminal interstitiality serves to 
situate the concept of "mental disorder" within the 
legitimizing narratives, thus providing solid grounding for 
the analogies of the courts. 
Of course, the principle of interstitiality has a cost. 
The principle limits the reach of sex offender 
commitments to those persons whose mental disorders 
render them inappropriate for prosecution. This result is 
sharply at odds with the narratives that gave birth to the 
sex offender commitment statutes, whose main theme 
included the need to address predicted crimes by persons 
who had been, and would continue to be, fully amenable 
to criminal prosecution. As a result, the courts are 
reluctant to embrace the principle of criminal 
interstitiality explicitly. Instead, they evoke its theme by 
indirect allusion. One of the benefits of the rhetorical 
techniques of analogy and evocation is that the narrative 
of legitimization need not squarely resolve this apparent 
75 
HeinOnline -- 8 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 76 1997
ERIC S. JANUS 
conflict. 
D. THE EVOCATION OF INTERSTITIALITY 
The article now examines how tl).e principle of 
interstitiality is expressed in the narratives of the three 
state supreme court decisions. It begins with Minnesota, 
since that court's treatment of the subject is the most 
direct. Minnesota's sex offender commitment law was 
enacted in 1939 and has survived unrepealed, though it 
was recently supplemented.87 The original statute 
authorized the civil commitment of persons with 
"psychopathic personalities." In State ex rei. Pearson v. 
Probate Court,88 the statute was challenged on the 
ground that it was "so indefinite and uncertain as to make 
it void."89 The court found the statute to be "imperfectly 
drawn,,,90 and narrowed its application so that it would be 
"in conformity . . . with the provisions of the 
constitution.,,91 So narrowed, the statute was held to 
apply only to persons who "have evidenced an utter lack 
of power to control their sexual impulses and who as a 
result are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, 
pain, or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable desire.'>92 In 1994, when the Minnesota 
Supreme Court was again called on to pass on the 
constitutionality of this statute in In re Blodgett, it 
reaffirmed the vitality of the Pearson "utter lack of power 
to control" test, calling the condition a "volitional 
dysfunction which grossly impairs judgment and behavior 
with respect to the sex drive."93 
These formulations rely on the principle of 
interstitiality to justify sex offender commitments, but 
they do so by evocation, rather than straightforward 
articulation. The language and concepts used by the 
court-"utter lack of power to control" and "volitional 
dysfunction"---recall the volitional prong of criminal law 
mental state defenses.94 More than fifty years earlier, the 
court noted that the statute specified that such problems 
of control did not constitute an excuse from crime: 
The act before us, in providing for the care and 
commitment of persons having uncontrollable 
and insane impulses to commit sexual offenses, 
treats them as insane. While the public welfare 
requires that they be treated before they have 
opportunity to injure others, it does not 
necessarily follow that their malady must 
excuse them from criminal conduct occurring 
in the past. 9S 
In 1994, the Blodgett court did not characterize the 
"utter lack of power to control" test as a criminal excuse 
test either. But the court's 1994 pronouncements are 
highly ambiguous, especially when considered in their 
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historical context. In 1972, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that the exclusion of volitional dysfunction 
from the insanity defense was of doubtful 
constitutionality: 
By the very nature of criminal law and the 
nature of our statute, volition is an element 
which almost necessarily must be considered if 
the statutory defense is to have any substance 
when applied to many cases, and certainly to 
this one. This is so because if, as in this case, a 
defendant might realize in a general way that it 
is illegal to strike a blow with a knife, but if he 
did not know that the act was ethically wrong, 
if he did not ''freely and deliberately" choose 
to commit the act, and if he did not have the 
will to prevent the act, there is missing an 
ingredient that has almost universally been 
considered essential before a crime can be 
committed. As indicated above, a basic 
postulate of our criminal law is a free agent 
confronted with the choice between doing right 
and doing wrong and choosing freely to do the 
wrong.96 
Thus, by adopting a volitional dysfunction test for 
sex offender commitments in 1994, the court was at least 
indirectly invoking its 1972 ruling. More to the point, the 
1994 court seems to suggest that individuals would be 
assigned to prisons or hospitals depending on the extent 
to which "criminal blame" could be assigned to them: 
"For the legislature which must provide the necessary 
prison cells or hospital beds, there are no easy answers. 
Nor are there easy answers for society which, ultimately, 
must decide to what extent criminal blame is to be 
assigned to people who are what they are."97 In the 
penultimate paragraph of the opinion, the court asserts 
that the "moral credibility of the criminal justice system . 
.. is at stake.,,98 The court supports this assertion with a 
quote from Professor Paul H. Robinson: "[I]t would be 
better to expand civil commitment to include seriously 
dangerous offenders who are excluded from criminal 
liability as blameless for any reason, than to divert the 
criminal justice system from its traditional requirement of 
moral blame."99 Put simply, criminal punishment is for 
those who are blameworthy, and civil commitment for 
those who are not. This is, of course, the principle of 
criminal interstitiality. 
But the court's parting shot in the opinion left 
unclear the significance of this discussion: "In the present 
imperfect state of scientific knowledge, where there are 
no definitive answers, it would seem a state legislature 
should be allowed, constitutionally, to choose either or 
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both alternatives for dealing with the sexual predator."loo 
Did the court mean that the legislature could deal with a 
particular "sexual predator" in both systems? Or, was the 
court suggesting that, collectively, the group of sexual 
predators could be dealt with in either system, as 
individual circumstances dictated? 
The facts of the cases are ambiguous, and this 
prevents a defmite conclusion about the significance of 
the "utter lack of power to control" test. The 1939 
Pearson caselOI reported no facts about the individual to 
be committed, so there is no way to tell whether he was 
(or could have been) held criminally responsible for his 
actions. The individual in the 1994 case, Blodgett, had 
been prosecuted and convicted for his crimes and had 
served his sentence. These facts suggest quite strongly 
that the "utter lack of power to control" test is not a test of 
criminal responsibility. However, the court carefully 
crafted the question presented so that it could avoid 
deciding just that point. "Blodgett then petitioned this 
court for further review, raising, however, only the 
constitutional challenge. In other words, Blodgett does 
not challenge here the fmdings that he has an 
uncontrollable sexual impulse dangerous to others."102 
Thus, in the court's view, Blodgett did not contest the 
applicability of the "utter lack of power to control" 
standard to himself. The court eschewed the opportunity 
to determine whether or under what circumstances the test 
would be properly met by an individual who had been 
held responsible for his crimes.103 Thus, a close reading 
of Blodgett reveals that the court spoke distinctly of the 
principle of criminal interstitiality, even though it 
carefully insulated the holding from the inconvenient fact 
that Blodgett had been held responsible for his actions 
and that his criminal responsibility had never been 
questioned. 
The official story told by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, then, uses the language of criminal excuse, thereby 
evoking the principle of criminal interstitiality. But it 
does so in an incomplete and somewhat ambivalent way. 
The court never says that sex offender commitments must 
be interstitial to the criminal justice system, but its 
reliance on the "utter lack of power to control" test 
indicates that the court is operating according to this 
assumption. Thus, Robert Schopp recognizes that the 
Minnesota court's "utter lack of power to control" 
construction "is a classic excusing condition."I04 
Katherine Blakey's support for the Minnesota sex 
offender commitment scheme depends centrally on an 
interstitial reading of the "utter lack of power to control" 
story told by Pearson and Blodgett: 
Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality 
Statute draws on the notion of legal insanity to 
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justify the civil commitment of a person who 
has a SPP [Sexual Psychopathic Personality] or 
is a SDP [Sexually Dangerous Person]. 
Because the statutory criteria are parallel to the 
irresistible impulse insanity test, the 
constitutional requirement that persons be 
"mentally ill" before they can be involuntarily 
committed in the civil system is satisfied. lOS 
There is substantial evidence that the Pearson 
court's language on control was similarly interpreted by 
other readers. The Pearson "utter lack of power to 
control" test, subsequently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme 
COurt,106 became a touchstone for litigation on other first 
generation sex offender commitment cases.107 It was 
clear that many of the courts in those cases regarded the 
"utter lack of power to control" formulation as key to the 
legitimacy of the statutes. Appellate decisions upholding 
the first generation sexual psychopath statutes commonly 
pointed to the legislative adherence to the Pearson "utter 
lack of power to control" test. Particularly instructive is 
Judge Bazelon's lengthy analysis of the D.C. Sexual 
Psychopath Act, which was modeled on the Minnesota 
Act, in which he characterized the proper subjects for 
commitment under the act as those "too sick to deserve 
punishment."108 
Judicial commentary subsequent to the Minnesota 
court's 1994 reaffirmation of the "utter lack of power to ' 
control" standard in Blodgett confirms that the story told 
by that language is the story of criminal interstitiality. 
Justice Gardebring, who formed part of the majority in 
Blodgett, explained in a subsequent dissent that the "utter 
lack of power to control" formula of Blodgett negates 
criminal intent: 
Either appellant has the capacity to intend his 
vicious acts, in which case he is properly held 
accountable in the criminal justice system, or 
he suffers from the "utter lack of power to 
control [his] sexual impulses," and is therefore 
subject to commitment as a psychopathic 
personality. How can he simultaneously intend 
his acts and manifest an inability to control his 
behavior?l09 
The narratives of the Washington and Wisconsin 
courts invoke the principle of criminal interstitiaIity with 
similar subtlety and ambiguity. As in the Minnesota case, 
the principle is positioned critically in the narratives of 
these courts, appearing in the stories just in time to 
vanquish the key challenges to the laws. 
The Washington court's opinion discusses whether 
the "primary" diagnoses given to the defendants, 
"paraphilia not otherwise specified" and "rape as 
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paraphilia," actually constitute mental illnesses 
warranting intervention outside of the criminal realm. At 
the turning point in the court's argument, it chooses 
language of volition and control to silence the defendants' 
arguments. The court asserts that people who suffer from 
paraphilia experience: 
recurrent, repetitive, and compulsive urges and 
fantasies to commit rapes. These offenders 
attempt to control their urges, but the urges 
eventually become so strong that they act upon 
them, commit rapes, and then feel gUilty 
afterwards with a temporary reduction of 
urges, only to have the cycle repeat again. This 
[is a] cycle of ongoing urges, attempts to 
control them, breakdown of those attempts, 
and recurrence of the sex crime. IIO 
As a result, such people require psychiatric 
treatment in order to "gain control" of their urge to 
assault. III 
To be sure, the Washington court does not announce 
the full implications of its focus on volitional control as a 
defining characteristic of sex offender commitments. But 
two of the commentators supportive of the sex offender 
commitment statute clarify the implications of the court's 
position. Alexander Brooks, a respected academic whose 
writing was relied on by the Washington court at a critical 
juncture of its discussion of the meaning of "mental 
disability,"112 asserted in his article that sex offender 
commitments should be limited to those exhibiting 
"uncontrollable pathological rape .... [A] rapist selected 
for civil commitment," he argued, "should have a 
recurrent, compulsive urge and a pathological need to 
repetitively carry out psychologically driven rape."113 He 
suggests that the statutory definition is limited to those 
whose mental pathology "impairs volitional controls and 
causes them to behave in the compUlsive, repetitive, 
irrational, and self-destructive ways that are typical of 
mental disorders."114 Marie Bochnewich, in a second 
article relied on by the Washington court, liS explicitly ties 
her support for the sex offender commitment statute to the 
principle of criminal interstitiality. She asserts that sex 
offender commitments are justified because they are 
directed against only those sex offenders who "are less 
blameworthy because they are less capable of exercising 
self control. . . . These uncontrolled, impUlsive sex 
offenders ... are least deserving ofpunishment."116 
The Wisconsin court's allusion to criminal 
interstitiality is still more subtle. It occurs, as with the 
other two courts, in the context of a discussion of whether 
the mental disorder at issue is constitutionally sufficient 
to support civil commitment. In response to the argument 
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that the statutory category of "mental disorder" is too 
broad, the court cites the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual for authority that the term "is only appropriate 
when a manifestation of dysfunction crosses the 
'boundary between normality and pathology."'117 But 
this authoritative definition does not appear to satisfy the 
court. In the ultimate volley of its argument, the court 
narrows the statutory defmition of "mental disorder." 
The court takes the statutory language requiring a 
disorder that "predisposes a person to engage in acts of 
sexual violence"118 and narrows it: The disorder must be 
one that "specifically causes the person to be prone to 
commit sexually violent acts in the future."119 This small 
change in language is best understood as the court's 
attempt to invoke the legitimizing power of criminal 
interstitiality by suggesting that sex offender 
commitments apply only to those people whose sexual 
misbehaviors are "caused" by a disorder and hence 
beyond their control. Causation rings of determinism, 
which, in tum, seems incompatible with the imposition of 
criminal responsibility.120 
All three courts tell a similar story in order to 
rationalize sex offender commitments as legitimate 
"preventive detention." The story told is that sex offender 
commitments will be applied to a narrow, well-defined set 
of individuals with a particular kind of "condition," one 
that is a "mental disorder." In this story, mental disorder 
serves a discriminative function. 
But all three courts feel compelled to refme even 
that story, and the narrowing hovers around the core 
notion of criminal interstitiality: that sex offender 
commitments will be applied only where volitional 
control is absent or diminished, free will is inoperative, 
and punishment is inappropriate. This is the story that 
gives sex offender commitment laws their "moral 
force."121 This is the story that explains that the subset of 
citizens who are committed are just like mentally ill 
persons, who may be committed without the stringent 
protections that are normally required when the State 
deprives a person of liberty. 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLEMENTING 
THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE: A CASE STUDY 
A. THE CONTEXT FOR LINEHAN I 
The courts resolve the hard policy choice involved 
in sex offender commitment statute challenges by 
invoking the principle of criminal interstitiality. But the 
resolution in the official narrative is a theoretical, 
doctrinal one. This section explores the explosive 
consequences of the Minnesota Supreme Court's actual 
implementation of the principle in In re Linehan. 122 This 
story demonstrates that the theoretically sound balance 
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imposed by the principle of criminal interstitiality falters 
upon application. In concrete cases, the powerful public 
and political mandate for prevention preempts the 
traditional safeguards of the Constitution. 
The early years of the Minnesota sex offender 
commitment law give context to this story. Pearson 
adopted the "utter lack of power to control" test in 1939. 
During the 1940s, 114 individuals were committed under 
the law.l23 The Minnesota Supreme Court decided one 
additional sex offender commitment case during this 
period,124 but did not mention the "utter lack of power to 
control" test. Nonetheless, in its early years, the law 
appears to have had a set of rules-in-use that was 
consonant with the espoused excuse-oriented "utter lack 
of power to control" legitimating construct. Thus, the law 
was used chiefly to hospitalize people who exhibited a 
variety of sexual behaviors that were illegal but relatively 
benign and non-violent. These commitments were often 
relatively brief. l25 They were viewed as a humane 
diversion from the criminal system for people whose 
"deviant" sexual interests were "more appropriately" 
treated as illness than crime.126 Thus, in a sense the law 
served a purpose interstitial to the criminal justice 
system.127 
The 1960s through late 1980s saw the law decline 
into relative disuse. 128 During this period, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court decided six additional cases involving the 
psychopathic personality commitment law. \29 In only 
one, Clements, did the court even mention the "utter 
inability to control" standard.130 Beginning in the early 
1990s, prosecutors in Minnesota rediscovered the law,\31 
but the larger social context in which the law had been 
developed was forgotten or ignored. The context for the 
resurrection of the law was public outcry over sexual 
violence committed primarily by recently released 
prisoners,132 a context decidedly different from that in 
which the law had originally been used and justified. The 
passage of time, along with the transformation of social 
context, reshaped the rules-in-use. 
Rather than a diversionary program for non-violent, 
"deviant" individuals, the law became a tool of social 
control applicable to the "most dangerous" sexual 
predators. \33 In this new context, where the focus became 
not how mad but how bad the individual was,I34 the 
archaic Pearson test seemed like surplusage. \3S 
Of the appellate cases decided in 1990, 1991, and 
1992, fifty-seven percent contained no mention of the 
Pearson "utter lack of power to control" standard.136 In a 
small number of cases, the defendant pointed out that the 
trial court had ignored the standard. In these cases, the 
Court of Appeals uniformly overruled the argument, 
stating that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
commitment.137 None of those cases contained any 
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discussion of the meaning of the "utter lack of power to 
control" element. 
Gradually, the Court of Appeals began to 
acknowledge that Pearson required a showing of "utter 
lack of power to control." Still, in these cases, the court 
did not discuss the meaning of the term. It characterized 
the issue as one of fact and dismissed all claims based on 
this mental disorder element by adopting a deferential 
review of the trial court's determination.138 In no case 
was failure to satisfy the "utter lack of power to control" 
test cited as a basis for reversing a sex offender 
commitment. 139 
Thus, by the time the constitutionality of the sex 
offender commitment law was before the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Blodgett, the "utter lack of power to 
control" test had been on the books for fifty-five years, 
but had hardly been mentioned. It had never served as a 
basis for reversing or denying a commitment in an 
appellate court case. In Blodgett, a major thrust of the 
dissent was that this abandonment of the "utter lack of 
power to control" test rendered the statute 
unconstitutional. 140 In the majority's analysis, this was 
beside the point. The fact that the statute could be applied 
incorrectly did not mean that it had no legitimate sphere. 
The court reaffirmed the Pearson "utter lack of power to 
control" test as the legitimizing element of the statute, 
and, in effect, promised to use appellate review to bring 
the rules-in-use into concordance with this official 
narrative. 141 
B. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT IMPLEMENTS 
THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE: LINEHAN I 
Five months after deciding Blodgett, and fifty-five 
years to the day after Pearson announced the "utter lack 
of power to control" test, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
made good on its promise. For the first time in the 
statute's fifty-five year history, the supreme court 
reversed a sex offender commitment. In In re Linehan, 142 
the court held that the state had failed to meet its burden 
of proving the "utter lack of power to control" element. It 
ordered 53 year-old Dennis Darol Linehan released. 
During the preceding fifty-five year period, over 
300 people had been quietly deprived of their liberty 
under a law whose constitutionality was justified on the 
basis of the principle of criminal interstitiaIity .143 When, 
for the first time, the supreme court actually implemented 
that principle, all hell broke loose. The story of the 
Linehan case and its aftermath unambiguously show that 
the public and the political process want an official 
narrative for sex offender commitments that paints a 
picture of legitimization but does not pay the concomitant 
price. 
On March 25, 1992, less than two months before 
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Linehan's mandatory release from prison, the Ramsey 
County (Minnesota) Attorney's office filed a petition for 
his commitment as a Psychopathic Personality. Linehan, 
a convicted kidnapper, strangled his 14 year-old victim in 
a 1965 attempted sexual assault, escaped from prison in 
1975, and within two weeks from the time of the escape 
attempted to sexually assault a 12 year-old. By 1992, 
Linehan had served twenty-seven years in prison. After a 
two week bench trial involving four mental heath experts, 
Linehan was committed as a psychopathic personality. 
The commitment relieved the State of its legal obligation 
to parole him.144 
On June 30, 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
reversed Linehan's commitment for failure to satisfY the 
Pearson "utter lack of power to control" standard. The 
prosecutor filed a petition for rehearing, delaying 
Linehan's release. During the ensuing weeks, public and 
political attention began to focus on the court's decision 
and Linehan's impending release. The matter headlined 
local news coverage for many days in a row:4S A 
prominent legislator characterized the chief justice of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, who wrote for the majority in 
Linehan, as the "zookeeper" who proposed "let[ting] the 
tigers out one by one to see if they're dangerous.,,146 A 
previously appointed Sexual Predators Task Forcel47 held 
legislative hearings attended by the Governor and the 
Attorney General to assess the effects of the Linehan 
decision. Politicians characterized the court's decision as 
potentially devastating to Minnesota's efforts to use sex 
offender commitment statutes to prevent sexual 
violence. 148 The Attorney General framed the question 
generated by Linehan thusly: "The question before us 
today is simple: how do we protect the public from some 
of the most dangerous criminals in society[?)"149 He 
proposed "tough" new laws, including a "sexually 
dangerous persons" commitment act that eliminated the 
Pearson "utter lack of power to control" standard. ISO The 
Governor agreed to call a special session of the legislature 
if the Task Force and legislative leaders could agree on a 
new sex offender commitment law.lsl 
On August 15, 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
denied Ramsey County's petition for rehearing. On that 
date, the State lost the authority to hold Linehan as a 
"patient" and was obligated to release him on parole. The 
Linehan matter became front page news and the lead 
story on local television news broadcasts. ls2 The 
Governor hastily ordered Linehan "paroled" to a cottage 
on the grounds of the state prison. He was guarded 
twenty-four hours a day by two guards and required to 
wear an electronic bracelet around his ankle. The State 
secretly installed hidden television surveillance cameras 
in the cottage and monitored Linehan's moves via 
monitors in an RV "command post" parked 100 yards 
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away. The taxpayers of Minnesota paid hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to provide this security for 
Linehan. 153 
Between August 15 and August 30, media attention 
intensified. Local talk show hosts, one of whom 
conducted interviews from her back yard hot tub, 
vigorously solicited Linehan and his attorneys to be 
guests on talk shows. Tabloid television shows such as 
"Geraldo" and "Behind Bars" sought interviews with 
Linehan and his attorneys. National news wires carried 
the story.IS4 CBS Morning News juxtaposed an interview 
of Linehan's 1975 attempted rape victim with a debate-
format discussion of the legal issues between one of 
Linehan's attorneys and the Ramsey County Attorney.lss 
The underlying question posed in all the news coverage 
was whether the state could keep a "sex psychopath" 
locked up even though he had served his time in prison: 
Will the constitution stand in the way of society's efforts 
to stop this man from raping again? 
On August 30, 1994, the Governor called the 
legislature into special session to debate the proposed 
Sexually Dangerous Persons Commitment ACt. IS6 This 
Act explicitly rejects the Pearson "utter lack of power to 
control" standard, thereby providing that persons with a 
"mental disorder" may be civilly committed even if they 
retain full control of their sexual behavior. 157 Its chief 
advocate, the Attorney General, acknowledged that the 
constitutionality of the new law was unclear. IS8 Media 
editorials split as to the constitutionality and advisability 
of using civil commitment to lock up sex offenders after 
they have served their full criminal sentences. IS9 The 
legislature retained the old Psychopathic Personality Law 
on the books as a safeguard in case the courts determined 
that the new law was unconstitutional. 160 Despite the 
constitutional doubts and the greater breadth of the new 
law as compared to the old psychopathic personality 
commitment statute (which had garnered only four of 
seven votes on the Minnesota Supreme Court), both 
houses of the legislature passed the bill unanimously. 161 
The Governor immediately signed the legislation. 162 On 
September 1, 1994, the new Sexually Dangerous Persons 
Act became effective, and the Ramsey County Attorney's 
office filed a petition against Linehan under the new 
law. 163 
Hundreds of sex offenders are released from prison 
each year in Minnesota. l64 What explains the intensity of 
the public and political reaction to Linehan's anticipated 
release? Linehan's crimes were indeed serious, and his 
case was notorious in Minnesota even before the 1994 
decision.16s In part, the public response reflected the fear 
that a notorious rapist/murderer would be released to 
repeat his crimes. Amplified in the heat of the highly 
contested political campaign of the chief prosecutor for a 
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seat on the United States Senate, this fear became a 
firestonn fed by political posturing on crime and 
violence. 
But there is another much more compelling story. 
This story confinns the moral and legal centrality of the 
"utter lack of power to control" test. In Linehan, the state 
got caught with its hand in the "preventive detention" till, 
helping itself to "civil commitment" without paying the 
"utter lack of power to control" price for it. Hypocrisy 
sharpens the sting of discovery and correction. 
Expressions of outrage stemming from this discovery are 
a measure of the moral distance between the state's false 
claim of legitimacy and the newly exposed rules-in-use. 
The Linehan decision was not a simple piece of statutory 
construction. It unearthed and threatened to remedy an 
embarrassing hypocrisy involving fundamental 
democratic values. 
Taken together, Blodgett and Linehan demonstrate 
the centrality of the mental disorder element to the 
official narrative of sex offender commitments. Blodgett 
adopted the test, and Linehan, in the face of a firestonn of 
protest, insisted on applying it. Together, these two cases 
suggest an -official.narrative that legitimates sex offender 
commitments by applying a real boundary, one defined 
by the principle of interstitiality. But the Linehan story 
illustrates the enonnity of the. public and political pressure 
underlying the mandate for prevention. In an unusual 
special session, the legislature unanimously enacted the 
Sexually Dangerous Persons Comm~tment Act, sending a 
clear and chilling message to the judiciary: Narratives 
about the constitutionality of sex offender. commitments 
are fine as long as they do not interfere with the mandate 
for prevention. 
IV. EXPOSING THE RULES-IN-USE: "MENTAL 
DISORDER" BECOMES A LEGAL FICTION 
In the previous part, this article described a visible 
enforcement of the official narrative and the frrestonn of 
public and political reaction it generated. In this part, the 
article examines the actual practice of sex offender 
commitments in Mmnesota in the post-Linehan I period. 
With a larger corpus of reported sex offender appellate 
commitment cases than any other state with a second 
generation sex offender commitment law, Minnesota 
serves as an appropriate subject of study to understand the 
actual operation of sex offender commitments in concrete 
cases. In evaluating the rules used by lower courts, this 
article looks to whether the "mental disorder" element 
serves a discriminative function, and, if so, whether such 
discrimination is justified by respect for the principle of 
criminal interstitiality. 
In the corpus of Minnesota cases, the "mental 
disorder" element fails on both grounds. In applying the 
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"utter lack .of power to control" test, the courts have 
created, a set of rules with no discriminative or 
justificatory power. In the nIles-in-use, the mental 
disorder element becomes a legal fiction, an element of 
proof that must be invoked, but that does not do any 
substantive work in the litigation. 
The task offonnulating workable rules-in-use based 
on the "utter lack of power to control" test has fallen to 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The task is certainly not 
an easy one. The rules-in-use must set out a non-arbitrary 
method for distinguishing between those who merely did 
not, and those who could not, control their sexual 
misbehavior. It is the inference from behavior (which the 
individual did not control) to capacity (which the 
individual could not control) that furnishes the "mental 
disorder" justification for sex offender commitments. 
This concept of "volitional dysfunction" has 
consistently baffled judges, forensic professionals, and 
philosophers.l66 If the "utter lack of power to control" 
test is to accomplish the discriminative function required 
for legitimization, the Court of Appeals and similarly 
situated appellate courts must develop a coherent theory 
of its meaning. Unfortunately, despite twenty-five cases 
raising the issue during the post-Linehan period, the 
Court of Appeals has thus far failed to do SO.167 Though 
the court appears to engage in a process of reasoning 
about the "utter lack of power to control" test, nowhere in 
the corpus of its cases can one find a straightforward 
declarative sentence explaining how one distinguishes 
incapacity to control (a mental disorder) from a failure to 
control (criminal behavior).168 
The Court of Appeals has not only failed to establish 
a workable test, it sends conflicting messages that 
frustrate efforts to extrapolate any coherent pattern. In 
some of its opinions, it has seemed to focus on 
impulsiveness as the meaning of "utter lack of power to 
control.,,169 In others, the court has taken pains to explain 
how behavior that appears planned and deliberate can 
reflect "utter lack of power to control."170 In some cases, 
the court has pointed to the individual's lack of 
acknowledgment that his behavior is wrong. l71 In others, 
the court has found a mental disorder where "he knows 
what he is doing and that it is wrong, but he chooses to do 
it anyway,,,172 In some opinions, the court has relied on 
evidence of the individual's misbehavior in controlled 
settings,I73 In others, only the individual misbehavior 
when not supervised supported such a finding,174 Finally, 
in some cases, the court has also suggested that proof that 
the individual's "will" is overwhelmed by strong sexual 
impulses,175 or that the individual's behavior is strongly 
"compulsive" points to a mental disorder,I76 In others, it 
is the strength of the individual's will to have sex that 
provides the factual support,177 Frequently, what supports 
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the finding is simply that the individual has repeatedly 
engaged in prohibited sexual behavior despite the 
consequences,178 a characterization that would apply to all 
repeat sex offenders. 
Even the two cases in which the court reversed a 
finding of "utter lack of power to control" do not help 
develop a coherent theory. In In re Schweninger, the 
court reversed a commitment of a non-violent pedophile. 
The court clearly understood "utter lack of power to 
control" as requiring impulsiveness and found that the 
individual's "planned and calculated" behaviors were 
inconsistent with such a finding. 179 The Schweninger case 
came directly on the heels of Linehan and appeared to be 
the beginning of an "impulsiveness" theory of "utter lack 
of power to control." But the court quickly altered its 
course. In In re Bieganowski and a series of other cases, 
the court explained that planning and deliberation could 
be consistent with "utter lack of power to control.,,180 
The Court of Appeals has reversed only one other 
case since Linehan. In In re Mentzos,181 the court 
overturned the lower court's "utter lack of power to 
control" conclusion, but only on the grounds that it was 
not supported by any expert testimony. Mentzos is devoid 
of any theory defining what constitutes "utter lack of 
power to control." 
Although the Court of Appeals has failed to 
articulate a theory, it is possible that a theory is inherent 
in its cases. To test this hypothesis, some principled 
theories of volitional incapacity are set out here for 
comparison with the court's decisions. 
In the most ubiquitous image underlying the "utter 
lack of power to control" concept, the individual has a 
"predatory sex impulse" and lacks the "power to control 
it.,,182 The "power" and the "impulse" are seen as two 
separate parts of the individual self. 183 The metaphorical 
image is of the person's "higher" self struggling against 
the overpowering sexual impulses of the "lower" self. 
Psychologists describe this mechanism as "ego-
dystonic,,,184 in the sense that the person "himself' is 
unhappy with the sexual impulses, tries to suppress or 
contain them, but eventuaIIy fails. The person is 
described as being "overpowered" by the strength and 
intensity of the impulses. 18s 
The volitional theories of both Morsel86 and 
Schoppl87 are consistent with this ego-dystonic approach 
and have the potential to perform a real sorting function. 
These theories translate volitional dysfunction into 
intense psychic pain as well as impaired cognitive and 
rationality functions. Psychologists and psychiatrists 
could identify circumstances in which psychic pain is a 
predominant feature or in which cognitive and rationality 
functions are severely impaired. 188 These are psychic 
phenomena that are, subject to the usual epistemological 
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problems associated with measuring mental and 
emotional states, relatively verifiable. 189 To make the test 
more principled, the courts would be required to set a 
threshold, as a matter of law, beyond which the "pain" or 
the cognitive impairment would have to pasS. 19O If this 
threshold were equivalent to the threshold for excusing 
criminal behavior, then the test would truly fulfill the 
theme of criminal interstitiality evoked in the official 
narrative. 
The Court of Appeals' early post-Linehan decision 
in Schweninger appeared to flirt with this theory of 
volitional dysfunction. In Schweninger, the court 
reversed a commitment because Schweninger's behavior 
was "planned and calculated," distinguishing "plotting, 
planning, seductions, payments, and coercive behavior .. 
. from an impUlsive lack of control."191 In this line of 
reasoning, planning is evidence that "conscious cognitive 
processes have intervened,"192 negating the conclusion 
that it is the "lower" impulses that are "in control" of the 
person's actions. 193 In In re Kunshierl94 the court seems 
to consider both Morse's pain theory and Schopp's 
rational impairment theory, citing testimony that 
Kunshier's "impulse to rape becomes all intrusive" and 
that his behavior is "impulse driven past any point of 
rational control.,,19S Similarly, in In re Hart, the court 
recited that the individual "experiences intense urges to 
sexuaIIy offend despite a victim's protests or resistance, 
and has profound difficulty controlling his behavior." 196 
However, the court never fully articulated this 
theory of volitional dysfunction, did not set legal 
thresholds, and quickly abandoned any required showing 
of impulsiveness. In Bieganowski and Mayfield, the court 
decided that "uncontrollability" was consistent with 
"planning and controlled behavior."197 In addition, the 
court made clear that it did not have in mind any sort of 
internal pain or internal struggle test. In both Adolphson 
and Irwin, the court appears most impressed with the fact 
that the individuals seemed to view their deviant sexual 
behavior as acceptable.198 
Other theories of volitional dysfunction do not rely 
on a bifurcation of the self into "higher" and "lower" 
parts. In these theories the individual's crimes flow from 
some core of his personality structure, not from an 
"internal struggle" between the lower impulses and the 
higher faculties. In this "ego-syntonic" approach to the 
control issues, all aspects of the personality are 
consonant. Volitional dysfunction is found when the 
sexual violence is so much a part of the person's 
psychological makeup that he "cannot" make any other 
choices. l99 Irwin and Adolphson, discussed above, both 
appear to adhere to this sort of a theory.zoo 
At a literal level, integrated self theories are much 
too broad. Acting in accord with the core of one's own 
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personality is certainly not a sign of volitional 
dysfunction, but rather of normal psychological 
functioning.201 But there is a narrower, more charitable 
reading of the integrated self test which is much more 
discriminative and perhaps closer to the principle of 
criminal interstitiality. Under this narrower construction, 
action is beyond the actor's volitional control to the 
extent that it would be continued despite negative 
environmental consequences. According to philosophers 
Culver and Gert, if a person always acts contrary to 
strong negative disincentives in the environment, he or 
she lacks the volitional ability to act otherwise.202 The 
American Psychiatric ·Association Task Force Report 
agrees, arguing that the best evidence of the ability to 
control behavior is a person's adaptation of his or her 
behavior to changing environmental conditions. 203 
The underlying theory is that the consequences 
flowing from misbehavior are so negative and, more 
importantly, so patent, that all "rational," "volitionally-
able" individuals would have avoided the misbehavior.204 
However, there are convincing arguments that even this 
narrowed integrated self test is not a meaningful account 
of volitional dysfunction. It is not discriminative, because 
virtually all repeat criminal behavior fits this test.2°s 
Thus, it fails to discriminate between those who "could 
not" and those who merely "did not" control their 
behaviors. 
At a more philosophical level, Daniel Dennett's 
insightful discussion of this issue shows that the 
conclusion that a person "could not have done otherwise" 
may say something about the "character" of the person, 
but says nothing about any "dysfunction" or about his or 
her moral or criminal responsibility: 
"Here I stand," Luther said. "I can do no 
other." Luther claimed that he could do no 
other, that his conscience made it impossible 
for him to recant. He might, of course, have 
been wrong, or have been deliberately 
overstating the truth. But even if he Was-
perhaps especially ifhe was-his declaration is 
testimony to the fact that we simply do not 
exempt someone from blame or praise for an 
act because we think he could do no other. 
Whatever Luther was doing, he was not trying 
to duck responsibility.206 
But given that even the philosophers are undecided 
on the point, it is worth noting that some decisions of the 
Court of Appeals appear at least implicitly to adopt the 
environmental-consequences theory. These cases point 
out that the defendant continued to engage in criminal or 
anti-social activity despite numerous sanctions for his bad 
behavior. For example, in Patterson, the court referred, 
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with apparent approval, to the state hospital's report that 
assumed that "'lack of power to control' relates to 
choosing to commit the offenses despite negative 
consequences.,,207 In Kunshier, the court cited testimony 
that the individual's "sexual impulses override any 
normal fear of capture or consequences, and he has 
admitted feeling 'fearless' while committing these 
assaults.,,20s 
If the court had hewed to this environmental-
consequences test, its "utter lack of power to control" 
jurisprudence might have had some legitimizing 
discriminative power. But the court's 1995 Toulou 
decision demonstrates that the court had no such 
narrowed test in mind. Turning the theory on its head, the 
court cited Toulou's conformance to external stimuli as 
the central evidence supporting the fmding of "utter lack 
of power to control.,,209 
This analysis shows that the concept of "utter lack of 
power to control," as established by the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals, has neither discriminative nor justificatory 
content. Instead, the court relies on pseUdo-reasoning: 
statements purporting to sound like legal reasoning that 
are in reality tautological and hence non-explanatory. 
Recall that the central, and most difficult, task of the 
"utter lack of power to control" construct is to 
demonstrate that a mental dysfunction legitimizes sex 
offender commitments. The key move is to infer mental 
incapacity from behavior. The philosophical theories 
provide rules for making that transformation, but the 
Court of Appeals has followed none of them. Consider 
the following, which the court has proffered as 
explanations of the inference from behavior to mental 
incapacity: 
• "He explained that an utter lack of control begins 
when the individual has an urge that cannot be 
delayed." Here, "experts explained how 
uncontrollability could occur with planning and 
controlled behavior."210 
• "The psychologists' explanations show that, while 
Young may show planning and premeditation by his 
grooming behavior, his behavior is nonetheless 
impUlsive and without volitional control in that he 
acts upon uncontrollable desires when presented 
with the opportunity to sexually abuse' young 
girls. ,,211 
• "The trial court concluded that Patterson 
'demonstrates an utter lack of power to control his 
conduct with regard to sexual matters.' In support 
of this finding, Dr. [M] testified that he believed that 
Patterson had an utter lack of power to control his 
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sexual impulses. Once 'the impulse has been 
created,' [M] explained, Patterson 'cannot control 
over time the need to act upon the urge. ",212 
o "Dr. [M] testified that appellant met this criteria 
(sic), because once appellant has the urge to be 
sexually active with an individual, he is compelled 
to do so, whether it occurs in several minutes or 
several hours."213 
o "Dr. [F] defines the term 'utter lack of control' in 
terms of an impulse control problem 'in which there 
is an inability to stop one's behavior despite being in 
an area of risk of being apprehended or caught.,,,214 
Though these passages have the rhetorical form of 
explanations, they simply replace one abstract 
psychological construct ("utter lack of power to control") 
with another equally opaque psychological construct 
("inability to stop," "compelled to do so," "cannot 
control," "uncontrollable desires," "cannot be 
delayed").215 They do not explain how "did not" is 
transformed into "could not,"216 and hence they do not 
perform the necessary discriminative and justificatory 
tasks claimed for the mental disorder element. 
V. HOLDING THE COURTS TO HARD 
CHOICES: CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN 
THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE AND THE 
RULES-IN-USE 
Courts confronting challenges to sex offender 
commitment statutes face two strong and opposing pulls. 
On one hand, the mandate for prevention demands long-
overdue, creative action to prevent sexual violence. On 
the other, fundamental American legal values-the "great 
safeguards" that American jurisprudence enforces when 
the State deprives its citizens of their liberty-abhor 
unlimited, unprincipled preventive detention. 
Courts have three choices to resolve this dilemma. 
The first two acknowledge that the two pulls are largely 
irreconcilable in the context of civil commitment. The 
first path strikes down sex offender commitment laws in 
order to maintain the primacy of the criminal system in 
addressing antisocial conduct. The second path upholds 
sex offender commitment laws, frankly acknowledging 
that they represent a hitherto unprecedented breach in our 
reliance on the criminal justice system. Two courts have 
taken the first path.217 None has taken the second path 
successfully.218 
The third path is the one taken by the supreme 
courts of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Washington. These 
courts uphold sex offender commitment schemes in order 
to vindicate the mandate for protection. But they also 
84 
insist on respect for the traditional constitutional 
protections and the primacy of the criminal law that those 
protections entail. They reconcile this dichotomy through 
a narrative that portrays sex offender commitments as 
business-as-usual civil commitments that fit comfortably 
into the traditional and limited exemption from criminal 
constitutional protections. 
The core truth of this narrative is that civil 
commitments are legitimate to the extent that they fill 
only the interstices unaddressed by the criminal law. This 
truth is a hard truth, because it stands precisely in the path 
of the mandate for prevention. But it is the truth, 
nonetheless, and that is why the three courts were 
compelled to include it in their narratives. 
But even if the three courts have told the truth about 
the principle of criminal interstitiality, their narratives are 
nonetheless fiction. Creative, aggressive, preventive civil 
confmement simply is not, and cannot be, consistent with 
the primacy of the criminal protections in our system. 
The courts have sought to preserve the integrity of their 
narratives by invoking the principle of criminal 
interstitiality; but in doing so, they have told a story that 
cannot be true. 
What are the consequences of a system that 
countenances the fictionalization of its legitimizing 
narrative? Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, in a 
somewhat different context, suggest that a system that 
does not act to bring its "espoused theories"219 into 
consonance with its actual practices is in, at best, a 
"tenuous equilibrium.,,22o Eventually, the dissonance will 
come out. And when it does, it tends to come out in 
revolutionary rather than evolutionary ways. 221 A system 
based on fiction invites collapse. 
Courts reviewing sex offender commitment laws 
should evaluate them as they truly operate. Espoused 
claims for legitimacy need to be checked against actual 
rules-in-use. The Minnesota experience demonstrates that 
the legitimizing constructions of high courts can be 
systematically fictionalized by the lower courts. Indeed, 
given the strong mandate for prevention and the 
narrowness of the legitimiZing conditions, it is likely that 
the experience of other states will be similar. The 
mandate for prevention seeks to prevent criminal 
behavior. The fundamental values of our Constitution 
and our Nation tell the hard truth that crime is punished 
and prevented through the criminal justice system. 
Legitimizing narratives that minimize this truth will, in 
the end, be fiction. 
Prevention of sexual violence ought to have as it 
foundation stories of pain, response, and legitimacy that 
are truth, not fiction.222 Otherwise, prevention of sexual 
violence will find its fate tied to unlimited, unprincipled 
preventive detention. The truth about sexual violence 
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cannot be vindicated by doing such violence to the "great 
safeguards" of our constitutional and moral values. 
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F. Schopp & Barbara J. Sturgis, Sexual Predators and Legal 
Mental Illness/or Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 437 
(1995); Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on 
Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PuGET 
SOUND L. REv. 597 (1992); Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the 
Legal Meaning and Significance 0/ Mental Illness, 3 PSYCHOL. 
PuB. POL'y & L. 534 (1995). 
26 See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 329 ("The introduction 
of psychotropic medications has revolutionized the treatment of 
the mentally ill, vastly diminishing the number of persons 
needing institutionalization and significantly relaxing the terms 
of confinement for those who are institutionalized."); cf 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, 
C.J., concurring) ("There can be little doubt that in the exercise 
of its police power a State may confine individuals solely to 
protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or 
communicable disease."). 
27 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); see also 
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). 
28 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
29 The Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions upholding sex 
offender commitment statutes claim no support from the parens 
patriae power of the state. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 
914 (government's compelling interest is "the protection of 
members of the public from persons who have an uncontrollable 
impulse to sexually assault."); In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at 
181(state's interest in treating sex offenders "serves and falls 
within the state's interest in protecting the public from sexual 
assault."). 
Parens patriae rationales are not entirely missing from the 
discussions of sex offender commitment laws. See Allen v. 
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986); In re Young, 857 P.2d at 
998-1000; Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122. Note that in neither 
Young, 857 P.2d at 994-96, nor Post, 541 N.W.2d at 119-20, 
does the statement of the facts support the notion that the parens 
patriae doctrine is properly invoked because the defendant is 
incompetent. 
30 In general, sex offenders are not incompetent to make 
treatment decisions. Paraphilia, one of the major diagnostic 
categories into which sex offenders are placed, denotes deviant 
sexual arousal patterns. Like other personality disorders, the 
paraphilia designation does not necessarily entail impaired 
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cognitive processes, but rather maladaptive, rigid, and persistent 
pattems of behavior. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
522-25,633 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IVJ; see generally 
THEODORE MILLON, DISORDERS OF PERSONALITY (1981); Emily 
Campbell, Comment, The Psychopath and the Definition of 
"Mental Disease or Defect" Under the Model Penal Code Test 
of Insanity: A Question of Psychology or a Question of Law?, 
69 NEB. L. REv. 190 (1990). 
31 See Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 610; In re Blodgett, 510 
N.W.2d at 910-12; cf WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.025 
(West Supp. 1996) (aiming Washington's sex predator law at 
both those found incompetent and those about to be released 
from prison). 
32 See Williamson, 184 F.2d at 282 ("Imprisonment to protect 
society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so 
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of 
excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it."); Millard, 
406 F.2d at 972 ("Substantively, there is serious question 
whether the state can ever confine a citizen against his will 
simply because he is likely to be dangerous in the future, as 
opposed to having actually been dangerous in the past."). 
33 See, for example, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 7b 
(West Supp. 1996); and WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(6) 
(West Supp. 1996), which incorporate certain criminal offenses 
into their definitions of the committable sex offender. 
34 Although the Constitution requires an actus reus prior to 
criminal prosecution or punishment, see LAFAVE & SCOTT, 
supra note 12, at 195, the purpose underlying the 1939 
Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act in Minnesota was to 
enable the state to commit individuals before they commit 
"horrifYing crimes." See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914 
("[T]he compelling government interest [at stake] is the 
protection of members of the public from persons who have an 
uncontrollable impulse to sexually assault."); Francis, supra 
note 2, at 145. 
The legislative histories of sex offender commitment 
statutes often specifY that the statutes are needed to compensate 
for "shortcomings" in the criminal justice system, including 
those caused by the double jeopardy prohibition and burden of 
proof requirements. See McCaffrey, supra note 13, at 912 
n.258; Psychopathic Personalities Subcommittee, Report, in 
MINNESOTA DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, REpORT TO THE 
COMMISSIONER: COMMITMENT ACT TASK FORCE, at 45, 48-50 
(1988) (Commitment law needed to protect the public against 
"individuals . . . who may not have been convicted of a sex 
offense, because of the reluctance of young and/or scared 
victims to testifY against perpetrators of sexual abuse," because 
of the "comparatively short correctional sentences" for sex 
offenders, and to confine persons who "may be dangerous but 
evade conviction due to the high burden of proof required in 
criminal cases."). 
35 See La Fond, supra note 1, at 671-77; Rideout, supra note 
88 
14, at 784-89. 
36 The stories of the victims are recounted in Boerner, supra 
note 3, at 525-37; La Fond, supra note 1, at 671-80; Rideout, 
supra note 14, at 784-89; and McCaffrey, supra note 13, at 887. 
For stories of the rapists, many of whom also have been victims 
in their lives, see Lawrence Wright, A Rapists Homecoming, 
NEW YORKER, Sept. 1995, at 56; Conrad deFiebre, Linehan: I 
Just Want to Live a Normal Life, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Aug. 29, 
1994, at AI. 
37 See La Fond, supra note 1, at 670-84 (describing the official 
narrative that came to stand for the Washington State sex 
offender commitment law). 
38 See sources cited supra note 36. 
39 Although sex offender commitment laws enjoy broad 
support, they have not met with universal acceptance even 
outside the legal community. See, for example, the following 
newspaper opinion pieces, which question the legitimacy of sex 
offender commitment legislation: Loophole-Closing a Mistake, 
DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Sept. 2, 1994, at 7A; New Law 
Endangers Constitutional Rights, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Jan. 
18, 1995, at 8A; Preventive Imprisonment, WASH. POST, Dec. 
14, 1996, at A26; Terry Tang, Popular Result at the Cost of a 
Dangerous Precedent, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at B4. 
40 My use of the terms "espoused rules" and "rules-in-use" is 
largely based on CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHON, THEORY 
IN PRACTICE: INCREASING PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (1974). 
41 See id. at xiii-ix. Compare Argyris and Schon's discussion 
of "espoused theories" and "theories in use." Id 
42 As Lafond points out, "'every story is a reduction, a fiction, 
made from a certain point of view.'" Lafond, supra note 1, at 
672 (quoting JAMES BoYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON 
THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 174 (1985)). I suggest 
a stronger use of the word "fiction." This is not the inevitable 
fiction of reduction, of point of view. Rather, I am suggesting 
that the story the high courts tell in the official narrative is not 
representative of what really happens in the lower courts. The 
official narratives are "made up" fiction, not reality observed 
and described from a point of view. See Michael L. Perlin, 
Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 
47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 631 (l993) (discussing "legal 
fictions" in mental health law). 
43 The invisibility of the rules-in-use in sex offender 
commitments has important consequences for litigators. I 
explore these issues in Eric S. Janus, Defending Sex Offender 
Commitments in Minnesota, in PSYCHOPATIlIC PERSONALITIES 
AND SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS § 3 (1995). 
44 In In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, the Washington Supreme 
Court considered constitutional challenges to the sex-offender 
commitment provisions of Washington's Community Protection 
Act of 1990. Andre Young and Vance Cunningham were 
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involuntarily committed to mental health facilities after juries 
determined that they were "sexually violent predators." Id. at 
992-93. The supreme court reversed Cunningham's 
commitment and affirmed in part and remanded Young's case. 
Under Washington law, a person who is found to be a 
"sexually violent predator" can be committed after he or she has 
served a criminal sentence. The statute defines "sexually 
violent predator" as a person "who has been convicted of or 
charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the 
person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if 
not confined in a secure facility." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 
71.09.020(1) (West Supp. 1996). 
A petition to commit Young was filed on October 24, 1990, 
one day prior to his release for his most recent rape conviction. 
In re Young, 857 P.2d at 994. He had been convicted of several 
rapes, starting in 1962. After a hearing in 1991, a jury 
concluded that Young was a "sexually violent predator." Id. at 
995. The petition to commit Cunningham was also filed in 
1990. The state filed the petition about four and one-half 
months after Cunningham had completed his most recent prison 
term for rape. Although Cunningham was only 26 years old 
when the state filed the petition, his criminal history reached 
back 10 years, including three rape convictions. Id. After a 
hearing, a jury concluded that Cunningham was a "sexually 
violent predator." !d. at 996. 
Young and Cunningham challenged the statute on several 
constitutional grounds. First, they claimed that the statute 
violated ex post facto and double jeopardy protections. !d. at 
992. Second, they raised issues of substantive due process. 
Third, Young and Cunningham alleged procedural due process 
violations. The court first held that neither the double jeopardy 
nor the ex post facto clause is violated by the law, finding the 
law to be civil, and not criminal, in nature, and its purpose 
remedial rather than punitive. Id. at 999. 
Addressing the substantive due process argument, the court 
held that Washington had a compelIing interest in treating sex 
predators and protecting society from them. Id. at 1000. In 
addition, it found no substantive due process problem because 
the statute allows civil commitment only after a finding of both 
a mental disorder and dangerousness. However, these must be 
proved by evidence of a recent overt act if the individual is not 
incarcerated at the time of the petition. 
The court found that the state did not afford equal protection 
because the state did not require the consideration of less 
restrictive alternatives for confinement of sex offenders 
although it is required by Washington's mental health statute. 
Thus, although the court affirmed the commitment for Young, it 
remanded the decision to determine whether less restrictive 
confinement was appropriate. As to the other issues, the court 
held that a unanimous jury verdict was required, that the statute 
was not vague, and that Young and Cunningham did not retain 
the right to remain silent at their civil hearings. 
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45 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, involved a challenge to 
Minnesota's Psychopathic Personality Law. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the statute conformed to constitutional 
requirements and upheld Blodgett's commitm~nt to a secure 
mental health facility. 
Minnesota law provides for the involuntary civil 
commitment of any person found to be a "psychopathic 
personality," defined as: 
the existence in any person of such conditions of 
emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, 
or lack of customary standards of good judgment, 
or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal 
acts, or a combination of any of these conditions, 
which render the person irresponsible for personal 
conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the person 
has evidenced, by a habitual course of misconduct 
in sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control 
the person's sexual impulses and, as a result, is 
dangerous to other persons. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18a (West Supp. 1996). 
Blodgett, 28 years old at the time of this case, had a history 
of sexual misconduct which began at the age of 16. Shortly 
before his 1991 release date from prison, and after evaluation by 
a psychologist, the state filed a petition for his commitment. 
The trial court found that Blodgett was a psychopathic 
personality, and committed him to the Minnesota Security 
Hospital. Blodgett, 510 N.W. 2d at 912. 
In his appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Blodgett 
raised two issues. First, Blodgett claimed that Minnesota's 
statute violated his right to substantive due process. Second, he 
claimed the statute violated his right to equal protection of the 
laws under the Minnesota and U.S. Constitutions. 
Blodgett pointed out that in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 
71 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a state may 
constitutionally: (a) imprison a convicted criminal for 
deterrence and retribution reasons; (b) confine persons who are 
mentally iII and dangerous; and (c) in certain narrow cases, 
subject persons who pose a danger to others or the community, 
to limited pre-trial confinement. Blodgett, 510 N.W. 2d at 914. 
Blodgett argued that he did not fit into any of these categories. 
Relying on State ex rei. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 
270,274 (1940), in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Minnesota's law, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court decided that Foucha did not prohibit the commitment of 
psychopathic personalities. The court further held that the State 
had a legitimate interest in the safety of the community. In 
addition, the court observed that Blodgett was entitled to release 
if his conduct was brought under control, which appeared to 
satisfy the requirements of Foucha. 
Blodgett also argued that to deny sexual predators their 
liberty while other dangerous people, not considered mentally 
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ill, were set free, violated equal protection. Blodgett, 510 N.W. 
2d at 917. The court dismissed this argument, noting the special 
danger, particularly to women and children, posed by sexual 
predators. Finally, the court reiterated the State's compelling 
interest in public safety which, when considered in light of the 
imperfect state of medical and scientific knowledge concerning 
the motivations behind the conduct of sex offenders, provided a 
sufficient justification for any unequal burden imposed by the 
law. Id. at 918. 
46 In Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, the State of Wisconsin appealed a 
trial court decision holding its "sexually violent person" statute 
unconstitutional. While the statute was challenged on grounds 
of double jeopardy, ex post facto laws, substantive due process, 
equal protection, and whether the governor's partial veto created 
a law which is incomplete and unworkable as applied to the 
state's Sex Crimes Act, this court dealt with only the last three 
issues. The court determined the double jeopardy and ex post 
facto issues in a companion case decided the same day. See 
Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105. 
The Wisconsin statute in question provides for the 
commitment of persons adjudicated "sexually violent persons" 
until the person no longer falls under this classification. WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 980.06(1) (West Supp. 1995). A "sexually 
violent person" is defined as someone who has been convicted 
of a sexually violent offense ... and who is dangerous because 
he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it 
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of 
sexual violence." Id. § 980.01(7). 
Samuel E. Post had been confined to the Mendota Health 
Institute following several convictions of sexual assault. Post, 
541 N.W.2d at 119. Ben R. Oldakowski also had been confined 
to Mendota after several sexual assaults involving kidnapping 
and other charges of assault and exposing himself. The State 
Department of Justice filed petitions to commit Post and 
Oldakowski as sexually violent persons on July 12, 1994, three 
days before their scheduled releases. The trial court found 
probable cause to believe that both men were sexually violent 
persons and ordered them confined to Mendota. 
Post and Oldakowski filed motions to dismiss the 
commitment, alleging the unconstitutionality of the Wisconsin 
statute. The trial court held that the statute violated double 
jeopardy and ex post facto laws, substantive due process, and 
the equal protection clause. Id. at 119-120. Thus, the trial court 
ordered the release of Post and Oldakowski. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute did not 
violate substantive due process. Id. at 122. It found a 
compelling state interest in protecting the public from those who 
are a threat to the safety of the community. It also found that 
the statute was narrowly tailored to meet that interest because it 
allowed commitment of only the most dangerous sex 
offenders-"those whose mental condition predisposes them to 
reoffend." /d. at 124. The court also rejected the argument that 
the statute's definition of "dangerousness" was an 
impermissibly low standard of "substantial risk." /d. at 126. 
90 
Post and Oldakowski also argued that the "sexually violent 
person" statute violated equal protection because it treated 
persons differently than under chapter 51 of the Wisconsin 
statutes for initial commitment for people with mental illnesses. 
Id. at 128. The court did not decide on a level of scrutiny to use 
because it found that all but one of the differences challenged 
passed strict scrutiny. Id. at 130. The court again found that the 
state had a compelling interest in protecting the public from 
sexually violent persons who are likely to commit future sex 
crimes. 
In addition, the court found that the distinction between 
dangerous and non-dangerous mentally ill persons is a sufficient 
reason for determining the type of care to be given. The court 
held that communities, through their elected representatives, can 
choose how to resolve their social problems in more than one 
way, as long as the solution is constitutional. Id. Since the 
question in equal protection cases is whether the government 
has an appropriate interest furthered by the differential 
treatment, the court found that treating violent sex criminals 
differently was constitutionally justified, as they pose a greater 
threat to the community. 
In Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin upheld the constitutionality of its "sexually violent 
person" statute. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980 (West Supp. 1995). 
In Carpenter, the court dealt with only the Ex Post Facto and 
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Wisconsin and U.S. 
Constitutions. 
The State of Wisconsin filed a petition to commit Carpenter 
in 1994 after he had served prison sentences for sexual assaults 
on minors. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d at 108. Schmidt had also 
been incarcerated for sexual assaults on minors when the state 
filed a petition against him. The trial courts found that the 
statute violated the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and 
Substantive Due Process Clauses of the Wisconsin and U.S. 
Constitutions. /d. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first held that there was not a 
double jeopardy violation. A statute violates double jeopardy if 
its principal purpose is punishment, retribution, or deterrence. 
/d. at 109-10 (citing State v. Killebrew, 340 N.W.2d 470, 475 
(Wis. 1983». Here, the court held that Carpenter and Schmidt 
failed to show that the statute had the principal purpose of 
punishment, or that it had the sufficient criminal characteristics 
such that it could be considered punishment. Carpenter, 541 
N.W.2d at 113. Much like the double jeopardy analysis, the 
court found no violation of ex post facto laws, because the 
purpose of the "sexually violent person" statute was not 
punitive, but, rather, to protect the public by providing 
treatment for sex offenders. 
47 The misuses of psychiatry as social control evoke 
frightening images. See, e.g., ANTHONY BURGESS, A 
CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1st rev. ed. 1988); Erlinder, supra note 
12, at 159 (likening Minnesota's system of psychopathic 
personality commitment to a "gulag"). 
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48 The principle of criminal interstitiality limits civil 
commitments to legitimate state interests that cannot be 
vindicated by use of the criminal law. The State, for example, 
has a legitimate interest in controlling dangerous individuals 
who are not criminally responsible. It also has a legitimate 
interest in protecting individuals who are incompetent to protect 
themselves. Neither of these interests is addressable by the 
criminal law. See infra Part II.C. 
49 See supra note 36, discussing the narrative origins of the 
various laws. 
50 Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 911-12; Young, 857 P.2d at 994-
97; Post, 541 N.W.2d at 119-20. 
The "past crime" and "likelihood of future harm" 
requirements are incorporated into the language of the statutes. 
Minnesota's law illustrates this, defining "sexually dangerous 
person" as a person who: 
(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual 
conduct ... ; 
(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other 
mental disorder or dysfunction; and 
(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful 
sexual conduct. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (sexually dangerous 
person); see also WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) 
(sexually violent predator); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) 
(sexually violent person). 
51 See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914; Young, 857 P.2d at 1000; 
Post, 541 N.W.2d at 129. 
52 The courts in all three decisions either state or suggest that 
sex offender commitments are narrowly tailored to meet the 
compelling interest of protecting against sexual violence. See 
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-15; Young, 857 P.2d at 1006; 
Post, :;41 N.W.2d at 124. 
53 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914 n.5; In re Young, 
857 P.2d at 1005-07; see also Post, 541 N.W.2d at 126. In 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a Louisiana civil commitment statute, which allowed an 
insanity 'acquittee, who had an antisocial personality disorder 
but no longer a mental illness, to remain indefinitely committed 
to a mental hospital on the basis of dangerousness alone, 
violated substantive due process. 
54 An influential writer on preventive detention suggests that 
the l1!ajor legitimizing principle should be the principle of 
proportionality, where the nature of the confinement would be 
tied to the severity of the danger posed by the individual. Alan 
M. Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested 
Framework/or Constitutional AnalysiS, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1277, 
1371 (1974). 
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All three states claim that sex offender commitments are 
limited to the "most dangerous." See Kirwin, supra note 3, at 
24; OFFICE OF THE ArroRNEY GEN., STATE OF MINNESOTA, 
TEsTIMONY OF ArrORNEY GENERAL HUBERT HUMPHREY III 
BEFORE THE LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL PREDATORS: 
PROPOSED SEXUAL PREDATOR REFORMS (AUGUST 11, 1994), 1 
("[H]ow do we protect the public from some of the most 
dangerous criminals in society?"). The Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that sex offender commitments must be limited to 
those who are "highly likely" to be violent, though the statute 
itself only requires a showing that violence is "likely." In re 
Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 167; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 
18b. The Washington Supreme Court construed the statutory 
term "likely" to refer only to persons whose "likelihood of re-
offense is extremely high." In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1003. The 
Wisconsin statute requires proof of a "substantial probability" 
of future sexual violence. In upholding the statute against 
constitutional attack, the Wisconsin Supreme Court described 
the commitment group as those who are "most likely" to engage 
in sexual violence, "distinctively dangerous," and "only of the 
most dangerous of sexual offenders." Post, 541 N.W.2d at 118, 
124,130. 
55 See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996). 
56 Schopp & Sturgis, supra note 25, at 449 ("mental status" 
terms in the law serve "discriminative" functions). 
57 Id. ("mental status" terms in the law serve '1ustificatory" 
functions). 
58 The Washington Supreme Court's story in this regard reads 
as follows: 
Here, petitioners Young and Cunningham were 
diagnosed with a mental disorder and share a 
lengthy criminal history of violent rape. Other 
individuals encompassed under the commitment law 
share similar profiles. In such circumstances, the 
Court has consistently upheld civil commitment 
schemes. 
In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 at 1001 (citing Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. at 426). The Minnesota Supreme Court explains: 
Mental illness is simply that, an illness, and should 
be treated po differently than other illnesses and 
with due respect for personal liberties. When, 
however, a person is both "mentally ill and 
dangerous to the public," our legislature has 
provided for commitment to the state security 
hospital. In like measure, and with like concern, our 
legislature has provided for commitment of the 
"psychopathic personality" who, because of an 
uncontrollable sexual impulse, is dangerous to the 
public. 
In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-15 (citation omitted). 
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59 See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601; CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 6600(a), (c) (West Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
709C.2, subd. 4 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a02(a) (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18b; 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
980.01(7); see also BRAKELET AL., supra note 1, at 740; Kirwin, 
supra note 3, at 24. It is not clear that civil commitment statutes 
need to require a showing of past overt acts. See BRAKEL ET AL., 
supra note I, at 35-36. 
60 Minnesota defines "sexual psychopathic personality" as 
the existence in any person of such conditions of 
emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, 
or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or 
failure to appreciate the consequences of personal 
acts, or a combination of any of these conditions, 
which render the person irresponsible for personal 
conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the person 
has evidenced, by a habitual course of misconduct 
in sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control 
the person's sexual impulses and, as a result, is 
dangerous to other persons. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18a. 
61 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a), (c); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.2, subd. 4; KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 59-29a02(a); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 
18b (referring, without further elaboration, to a 
"sexual personality, or other mental disorder or 
dysfunction"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 
(defining "abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired 
condition affecting the emotional or volitional 
capacity which predisposes the person to the 
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree 
constituting such person a menace to the health and 
safety of others"). 
Despite the "mental disorder" requirement, it is generally 
acknowledged that sex offenders are not susceptible to standard 
civil commitment methods. For example: 
[The Washington] legislature finds that a small but 
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent 
predators exist who do not have a mental disease or 
defect that renders them appropriate for the existing 
involuntary treatment act, chapter 71.05 RCW, 
which is intended to be a short-term civil 
commitment system that is primarily designed to 
provide short-term treatment to individuals with 
serious mental disorders .... 
Id. § 71.09.010 (West 1992). 
62 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915-16; In re Young, 857 
P.2d at 1001-03; Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122-23; Katherine P. 
Blakey, Note, The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous 
Sex Offenders is an Appropriate Legal Compromise Between 
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"Mad" and "Bad"-A Study of Minnesota's Sexual 
Psychopathic Personality Statute, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL'y 227, 259-64 (1996) (exploring the madlbad 
dichotomy). 
63 The Washington legislation discusses this explicitly. WASH. 
REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West 1992). The differences 
are the focus of the Kansas Supreme Court's discussion of its 
sex offender commitment statute. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 
at 135. 
64 See MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: 
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 49-78 (1990). 
65 See STUART A. KIRK & HERB KUTCHINS, THE SELLING OF 
DSM: THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE IN PSYCHIATRY 21 (1992) 
(describing the view taken by "many sociologists" that "mental 
illness was merely another instance of how society labels and 
controls those who behave badly"). This concern is the main 
theme of most of the articles that are critical of sex offender 
commitments. See. e.g .• Lisa T. Greenlees, Washington State's 
Sexually Violent Predators Act: Model or Mistake?, 29 AM. 
CRIM. L. REv. 107, 130 (1991) (arguing that vague definitions 
allow those who should not be committed to slip through the 
cracks); Lafond, supra note 1, at 658 (demonstrating the 
Washington Legislature "deliberately chose to abuse" the 
medical model of civil commitment); Wettstein, supra note 25, 
at 603. 
66 The undesirable consequences of the manipulability of 
psychiatric labels would be magnified in the sex offender 
commitment context compared to the standard civil commitment 
context. In the standard civil commitment setting, as envisioned 
by the Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 
(1978), there is a layered review to catch mistakes in the 
commitment process. /d. at 428-29. In the sex offender 
commitment context, in contrast, there are layered impediments 
to review, which magnify "mistakes" in the initial commitment 
process, See Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 23, 
at 195-206. 
67 The Washington court addressed the issue by stating 
"psychiatric and psychological clinicians who testify in good 
faith as to mental abnormality are able to identify sexual 
pathologies that are as real and meaningful as other pathologies 
already listed in the DSM." In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1001. 
Minnesota's assurance is equally as conclusory: "Whatever the 
explanation or label, the 'psychopathic personality' is an 
identifiable and documentable violent sexually deviant 
condition or disorder." In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915. The 
Wisconsin court addresses this issue as follows: 
In support of its argument that a "mental disorder" 
cannot be a sufficient condition for commitment, the 
dissent cites testimony that "mental disorders are the 
broad big umbrella that all of us could fall under." 
On the contrary, the DSM-IV states that a diagnosis 
of "disorder" is only appropriate when a 
manifestation of dysfunction crosses the "boundary 
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between normality and pathology." The DSM-IV 
acknowledges that "no definition adequately 
specifies precise boundaries for the concept of 
'mental disorder.'" However, a mental disorder is 
"conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral 
or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in 
an individual" and must reflect a current state of 
distress, impaired functioning or significant risk of 
pain, death or loss of freedom. Disorders do not 
include merely deviant behaviors that conflict with 
prevailing societal mores. 
Post, 541 N.W.2d at 123. 
68 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-15; In re Young, 857 
P.2d at 1001-03; Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122-24. This approach 
has been criticized by the Supreme Court of Kansas. See In re 
Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 135. 
69 See Post, 541 N.W.2d at 123-24; Jerome C. Wakefield, The 
Concept of Mental Disorder: On the Boundary Between 
Biological Facts and Social Values, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 373 
(1992) [hereinafter Wakefield, Concept of Mental Disorder]; 
Jerome C. Wakefield, Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction: A 
Conceptual Critique of DSM-IlI-R's Definition of Mental 
Disorder, 99 PSYCHOL. REv. 232 (1992) [hereinafter Wakefield, 
Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction] (discussing difficulties in 
defining "mental disorder"). 
70 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915 ("The psychopathic 
personality statute identifies a volitional dysfunction which 
grossly impairs judgment and behavior with respect to the sex 
drive. Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (West 1992 
[defining 'mentally ill person']"). 
71 The court ignores a huge literature on the subject of 
"volition." See, e.g., HERBERT FINGARETIE & ANN FINGARETIE 
HAsSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL REsPONSmILITY 
(1979); ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL REsPONSmILITY (1991); Seymour L. 
Halleck, Which Patients Are Responsible for Their Illnesses?, 
42 AM. 1. PSYCHOTHERAPY 338 (1988); Stephen 1. Morse, 
Culpability and Control, 142 U. PENN. L. REv. 1587 (1994). 
In fact, the author of the court's opinion ignored his own 
dictum from a previous case: 
[T]here is no practical way of distinguishing 
between an uncontrollable and a controllable 
impUlse. Because an impulse has not been resisted 
does not always mean that it could not have been ... 
. The irresistible impulse test leaves too much to 
conjecture and unverifiable theorizing .... 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 323, 334 
(Minn. 1991) (Simonett, J., dissenting). 
The court cites two social science references on the issue of 
mental disorder. But neither reference touches on the issue of 
VOLUME 8:2 1997 
SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENTS 
"volitional dysfunction" even tangentially. See In re Blodgett, 
910 N.W.2d at 915 n.7 ("The manual indicates that the 
antisocial personality disorder may at times be characterized by 
sexual promiscuity.") (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
342-46 (3d ed. rev. 1987)); id. at 915 n.8 ('''Sexual offenders 
have been found to present distorted and disturbed thought 
processes . . . . ",) (quoting Margit Henderson & Seth 
Kalichman, Sexually Deviant Behavior and Schizotypy: A 
Theoretical Perspective with Supportive Data, PSYCHIATRIC Q., 
Winter 1990, at 281). 
72 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915. Here -the court's 
terminology seems imprecise. See Park E. Dietz, Sex Offenses: 
Behavioral Aspects, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 
1485 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (asserting that some sexual 
crimes result from sexual deviancy, and some are the product of 
sexual "normalcy" combined with antisocial behaviors). Does 
the Court here mean to restrict the term "psychopathic 
personality" to those who have a "sexual deviancy" in addition 
to a "volitional dysfunction"? 
73 In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 at 1001. This approach has been 
criticized by the Supreme Court of Kansas. See In re Hendricks, 
912 P.2d at 135. 
74 See Vernon L. Quinsey, The Prediction and Explanation of 
Criminal Violence, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 117 (1995) 
(discussing whether psychopathic personality is a real disorder); 
see generally Wakefield, Concept of Mental Disorder, supra 
note 69; Wakefield, Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction, supra 
note 69; see also KIRK & KUTCHINS, supra note 65, at 28-30 
(discussing the problems of diagnostic validity in the DSM-III); 
Allen Frances, The DSM-III Personality Disorders Section: A 
Commentary, 137 AM. 1. PSYCHIATRY 1050, 1050 (1980) 
("[p]ersonality disorders are not at all clearly distinct from 
normal functioning or from each other."); R. Rogers et aI., 
Diagnostic Validity of Antisocial Personality Disorders, 16 L. 
& HUMAN BEHAv. 677 (1992); Thomas A. Widiger & Timothy 
J. Trull, Personality Disorders and Violence, in VIOLENCE AND 
MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 203 
(John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994) ("DSM III-R 
is a dichotomous model that imposes arbitrary categorical 
distinctions between the presence and absence of a disorder that 
may have little relationship to the predictability of violent 
behavior. The diagnostic categories are substantially 
heterogeneous with respect to the personality variables that are 
most likely to be predictive of violent behavior."); James S. 
Wulach, Diagnosing the DSM-III Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, 14 PROF. PSYCHOL. REs. & PRAC. 330 (1983) 
(questioning validity of Antisocial Personality Disorder 
diagnosis). 
75 See SCHOPP, supra note 7i; Schopp & Sturgis, supra note 
25, at 449 (observing that "mental status" terms in the law serve 
"discriminative" and '1ustificatory" functions); see generally 
sources cited supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
76 Part V of this article assesses the Minnesota mental 
93 
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disability element for its ability to perform this discriminative 
task. 
77 See Schopp & Sturgis, supra note 25. 
78 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note II (observing that criminal, 
though not civil, confinement is premised on culpability, and 
advocating the proposition that civil commitment should "pick 
up the slack" to protect the public from dangerous offenders 
who are not reached by the criminal justice system). 
79 For fuller discussion of this principle, see generally Eric S. 
Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled 
Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 
IND. L.J. 157 (1996); SCHOPP, supra note 71; Schopp & Sturgis, 
supra note 25; Winick, supra note 25; Blakey, supra note 62. 
80 See Janus, supra note 79. 
81 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 428 ("'moral force of the 
criminal law"') (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970)). 
82 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 3 MENTAL DISABILIlY LAW § 15.02 
(1989) (recounting the historical bases of the insanity defense); 
Stephen 1. Morse, Causation, Compulsion, and Involuntariness, 
22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 159 (1994); Robinson, 
supra note 11 (discussing how this legitimizes the criminal law). 
83 There are other inherent, "substantive" limits on the reach of 
the criminal law. For example, the criminal law, which operates 
retrospectively on individuals, may not be able to deal 
effectively with the threat of epidemic. Thus, non-criminal 
confinement may be acceptable in some situations to address 
epidemic disease. See Eric S. Janus, Aids and the Law: Setting 
and Evaluating Threshold Standards for Coercive Public 
Health Interventions, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 503, 505 
(1988). 
84 The principle of interstitiality underlies all non-criminal 
forms of incarceration. Very briefly, there are four maj or forms 
of non-criminal incarceration. Parens patriae commitments 
address the incapacity of an individual to act in his or her best 
interests, and thus address non-criminal harm. Insanity 
acquitees are committable because their behavior is 
substantively beyond the reach of the criminal law. As a 
regulatory measure, pre-trial detainees may be held based on 
their future dangerousness because, by definition, criminal 
sanctions are unavailable prior to trial. See United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Quarantine laws are addressed to 
epidemics, a threat of a different order than individual crimes; 
because epidemics grow exponentially and threaten entire 
populations, the harm is beyond the reach of post-behavior 
criminal sanctions. See Janus, supra note 83. 
94 
The principle of interstitiality is consistent with 
the result and the key language of Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. at 82: 
[T]he State does not explain why its interest would 
not be vindicated by the ordinary criminal processes 
involving charge and conviction, the use of 
enhanced sentences for recidivists, and other 
permissible ways of dealing with patterns of 
criminal conduct. These are the normal means of 
dealing with persistent criminal conduct. 
85 There are other, less persuasive narratives the courts could 
have adopted in an attempt to legitimize sex offender 
commitments. They could have adopted a ''jurisprudence of 
prevention" theme, see Richards, supra note 6, in which it is the 
strength of the state's interest in countering sexual violence 
which alone suffices to justifY a "regulatory" taking of the 
individual's liberty. This theme entails the principle of 
proportionality, alluded to supra note 52. All of the courts 
clearly reject this story. 
Second, the courts could have invoked a parens patriae 
justification for sex offender commitments. This would have 
involved characterizing sex offenders as incompetent, in the 
sense of being unable to care for themselves. The parens patriae 
justification can be viewed as a subset of the principle of 
interstitiality, in the sense that the "self-protection" role of 
parens patriae commitments is beyond the reach of the criminal 
justice system. The Washington and Wisconsin courts both 
mention the parens patriae interest, but do not develop it. In 
particular, neither court attempts to characterize the mental 
disorder element as fitting into a parens patriae theory. 
Compare Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), where the 
parens patriae assumption seems to be a key assumption the 
U.S. Supreme Court makes in describing Illinois' sex offender 
commitment statute. 
Finally, the courts could have adopted a narrative of 
difference, in which the state's right to invoke non-criminal 
incarceration arises not from an enhanced interest of the state, 
but from a set of rights that are diminished because of the 
individuals' membership in a "degraded" class or category. Cf 
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Though none of the courts 
openly espoused such a narrative, its seeds are liberally 
scattered throughout the cases on sex offender commitments. I 
discuss this issue in more detail in Eric S. Janus, Toward a 
Conceptual Framework for Assessing Police Power 
Commitment Legislation, 76 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997). 
86 The classic articulation is found in Developments - Civil 
Commitment, supra note 21. Citing Pearson, 287 N.W. 297, 
303 (Minn. 1939), this article notes that "police power 
commitment standards would appear to be unconstitutionally 
overbroad unless mental illness is interpreted to mean a 
condition which induces substantially diminished criminal 
responsibility." Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note 
21, at 1233-34. "Criminal irresponsibility" would be defined 
"in terms of inability to control one's conduct." Id. at 1235; see 
also Joseph M. Livermore et aI., On the Justifications for Civil 
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 86 (1968); Note, 
Standards of Mental Illness in the Insanity Defense and Police 
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Power Commitments: A Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 60 
MINN. L. REv. 1289, 1298 (1976) (police power commitments 
justified by inability to control behavior); Stephen J. Morse, A 
Preforence for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary 
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54, 
59 (1982) ("The primary theoretical reason for allowing 
involuntary commitment of only the mentally disordered is the 
belief that their legally relevant behavior is the inexorable 
product of uncontrollable disorder, whereas the legally relevant 
behavior of a normal p'erson is the product of free choice. . . . 
Because the individual will ultimately have little or no choice in 
deciding whether to act violently, it does not violate the 
disordered person's dignity or autonomy to hospitalize him or 
her preventively, even in the absence of strong predictive 
evidence of future dangerousness."). 
The contemporary scholarship confirms this pedigree. See 
SCHOPP, supra note 71; Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, 
Prediction of Dangerousness and Washington's Sexually 
Violent Predator Statute, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 277, 305 
(1992) (Sex offender commitment is justified because it is 
directed only against those sex offenders who "are less 
blameworthy because they are less capable of exercising self 
control." "[T]hese uncontrolled, impulsive sex offenders ... are 
'least deserving of punishment. "'); Winick, supra note 25, at 
538 ("[F]or the purpose of commitment to a psychiatric 
hospital, a condition must be capable of so impairing 
functioning that the individual is unable to engage in rational 
decision making or to control his or her behavior.") 
87 The law was supplemented in 1994 with the Sexually 
Dangerous Persons (SDP) Act. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, 
subd. 18b. See supra note 50 for the statute's definition of 
"sexually dangerous person." Both laws contain "past act" and 
"dangerousness" requirements. The SDP Act differs from 
Minnesota's psychopathic personality law, see supra note 58, in 
that "it is not necessary [for purposes of the SDP Act] to prove 
that the person has an inability to control the person's sexual 
impulses." § 253B.02, subd. 18b. 
88 Pearson, 287 N.W. at 303. 
89 Id. at 302. 
90 !d. 
91 Id. 
92Id. 
93 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915. 
94 See Paul H. Robinson, 1 CRlMINALLAWDEFENSES § 173(c) 
(1st ed. 1984); Schopp & Sturgis, supra note 25, at 446; see 
generally SCHOPP, supra note 71; Blakey, supra note 62; Morse, 
supra note 71. 
95 Pearson, 287 N.W. at 303. Minnesota's law provides that 
"[t]he existence in any person of a condition of sexual 
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psychopathic personality or the fact that a person is a sexually 
dangerous person shall not in any case constitute a defense to a 
charge of crime, nor relieve such person from liability to be 
tried upon a criminal charge." MINN. STAT. ANN. §253B.185, 
subd.3. 
96 State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 788 (Minn. 1?72) 
(emphasis added). 
97 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 917. 
98 !d. at 918. 
99 !d. at 918, n.16, citing Robinson, supra note 11, at 716. 
100 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 918. 
101 287 N.W. at 303. 
102 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 912. 
103 The court characterizes the "utter lack of power to 
control" element as a "finding," presumably a finding of fact. 
!d. Several months later, in In re Linehan, the court recognized 
that the "utter lack of power to control" test should be reviewed 
de novo as a question oflaw. 518 N.W.2d at 613. 
104 Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of 
the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'y & L. 161, 
161 (1995). Schopp also notes that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court "did not question the convictions or prison sentences" of 
those who had been committed. Id. While this is technically 
correct, it does not acknowledge that the court construed the 
question before it as a facial, rather than as applied, challenge. 
In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915. Thus, as pointed out in the 
text, the court had no opportunity to question the applicability 
of a (properly construed) "utter lack of power to control" test to 
a person who, like Blodgett, had been held criminally 
responsible. The distinction is important. Schopp's 
characterization might be read to suggest that the court held that 
the ''utter lack of power to control" test could properly include 
criminally responsible individuals, whereas the more 
conservative interpretation of the court's opinion is that it 
avoided the issue altogether. 
105 Blakey, supra note 62, at 263. 
106 Pearson, 309 U.S. at 274. 
107 Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 514 (4th Cir. 1964) 
(noting that the statute was "carefully drawn to conform to the 
[Pearson] definition," and therefore not facially 
unconstitutional, but "may be fraught with the possibility of 
abuse in that if not administered in the spirit in which it is 
conceived it can become a mere device for warehousing the 
obnoxious and antisocial elements of society"); Director v. 
Daniels, 221 A.2d 397, 409 (Md. Ct. App. 1966) 
(constitutionality of the Maryland statute saved by construction 
requiring a "psychiatric disorder manifested by . . . an 
95 
HeinOnline -- 8 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 96 1997
ERIC S. JANUS 
uncontrollable desire . . . which is uncontrollable by the 
individual"); State v. Mandary, 178 Neb. 383, 396 (1965) 
(Nebraska's sex offender statute mandates commitment and 
treatment for those "likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury" 
as a result of "uncontrolled and uncontrollable desires"). 
108 Millard, 406 F.2d at 969. 
109 Linehan 1,518 N.W.2d at 615 (Gardebring, 1., dissenting). 
110 In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1002 (emphasis added). 
III The court's account of the dynamics of rape is remarkably 
similar to Professor Morse's prescription for the volitional 
excuse. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The 
Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 820 
(1985). 
112 See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1000-03 (citing Brooks, 
supra note 4, at 733). 
I 13 Brooks, supra note 4, at 732. 
114 Id. at 730 (emphasis added). 
115 In re Young, 857 P.2d at 998 (citing Bochnewich, supra 
note 86, at 278). 
116 Bochnewich, supra note 86, at 305. 
117 Post, 541 N.W.2d at 123 (quoting DSM-IV, supra note 30, 
at xxi). 
118 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(2) (emphasis added). 
119 Post, 541 N.W.2d at 124 (emphasis added). 
120 Some prominent tests of criminal responsibility tum on 
the presence or absence of such causation. The American Law 
Institute adopted the following language: "A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962) (emphasis added). 
Chief Judge Bazelon held in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 
862,874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), "that an accused is not criminally 
responsible ifhis unlawful act was the product of mental disease 
or mental defect" (emphasis added). Cf John Q. La Fond, 
Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute: Law or 
Lottery? A Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND 
L. REv. 755, 767 (arguing that "mental illness assumes there is a 
causative defect in cognitive, emotional, or volitional processes 
that can be diagnosed and, in most cases, treated" and that 
absence of this "defect" in sex offender commitment cases is 
fatal). 
There is no need to engage here in a discussion of causality 
and its relationship to criminal responsibility. See Morse, supra 
note 86, for a cogent debunking of the notion that "causation" 
96 
equals lack of criminal responsibility. It is sufficient to point 
out that the Wisconsin court used the notion of behaviors 
"caused by" a disorder to make its argument more persuasive, 
evoking an image of human behaviors that de-emphasizes free 
will and human behavioral agency. /d. at 159. 
121 Courts often acknowledge the importance of maintaining 
the moral legitimacy of the criminal law. See, e.g., In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (discussing "moral force" of 
the criminal law); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 918 ("moral 
credibility of the criminal justice system" at stake). 
122 Linehan L 518 N.W.2d 609. 
123 Erickson, Psychopathic Personality Statute, supra note I. 
124 Dittrich v. Brown County, 9 N.W.2d 510, 511 (Minn. 
1943). 
125 See Erickson, Northern Lights, supra note 1, at 3; see also 
In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 910 (Wahl, J., dissenting). 
126 See Millard, 406 F.2d at 966 ("The Sexual Psychopath 
Act was enacted in 1948 as a 'humane and practical approach to 
the problem of persons unable to control their sexual 
emotions."') (quoting SENATE COMM. ON TIIE DISlRICT OF 
COLUMBIA, PROVIDING FOR TIIE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL 
PSYCHOPATIIS IN TIIE DISlRICT OF COLUMBIA, S. REp. No. 80-
1377, at 5 (1948)); Erickson, Northern Lights, supra note 1, at 3 
("Despite the emphasis on dangerousness in Minnesota's 
Psychopathic Personality statute, persons committed under it in 
the first decade were mostly window peepers, teenagers who 
masturbated excessively or had sexual contact with animals, 
consenting adult homosexuals, or non-violent pedophiles."); 
John Pratt, Governing the Dangerous: An Historical Overview 
of Dangerous Offender Legislation, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 21, 
26-27 (1996) (discussing the treatment of homosexuality in 
"dangerous persons" statutes). 
127 Cf Chief Judge Bazelon's lengthy analysis of the D.C. 
Sexual Psychopath Act, which was modeled on the Minnesota 
Act upheld in Pearson, 309 U.S. 270. Bazelon characterized 
the proper subjects for commitment under the act as those "too 
sick to deserve punishment." Millard, 406 F.2d at 969. 
128 See Kirwin, supra note 3, at 22. According to the 
Minnesota Department of Human Services, admissions under 
Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute declined as 
follows: 
1940's 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 
141 85 32 18 14 
Facsimile transmiSSion from Mmnesota Security Hospital, 
Number of Men Admitted as Psychopathic Personalities (Oct. 
17, 1995) [hereinafter MSH Fax] (on file with author). 
129 In re Joelson, 385 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1986); Enebak v. 
Noot, 353 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1984); In re Joelson, 344 
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW 
HeinOnline -- 8 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 97 1997
N.W.2d 613 (Minn. 1984); Bailey v. Noot, 324 N.W.2d 164 
(Minn. 1982); In re K.B.C., 308 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. 1979); 
Keiser v. Sheppard, 194 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1972). During the 
same period, the Minnesota Court of Appeals also decided six 
cases. In re Clements, 440 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. ct. App. 1989); 
In re Clements, No. CX-88-1058, 1988 Minn. App. LEXIS 654 
(Minn. Ct. App. July 27, 1988); Bailey v. Gardebring, No. C8-
87-1839, 1988 WL 19366 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1988); In re 
Brown, 414 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re Stone, 
376 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re Martenies, 350 
N.W.2d 470 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
130 440 N.W.2d 133. In that case the court alluded to the 
standard, but reviewed compliance with the standard using an 
error-of-fact, deferential review. Id. at 136 ("When evidence as 
to the existence of a psychopathic personality is in conflict, the 
question is one of fact to be determined by the trial court upon 
all the evidence.") (citing In re Martenies, 350 N.W.2d at 472). 
131 PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. 
AUDITOR (MINNESOTA), PSYCHOPATIllC PERSONALITY 
COMMITMENT LAW 1 (Feb. 1994). From January 1990 through 
August, 1995, 100 people were admitted under Minnesota's sex 
offender commitment laws. Conrad deFiebre, Psychopathic Sex 
Offenders Get New Home, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRm., Nov. 5, 
1995, at IB; MSH Fax, supra note 128. 
132 See Kirwin, supra note 3, at 22. 
133 Id. at 25 ("Under the current system, civil commitment is 
applied only to the relatively few, most dangerous, sexual 
predators."); Hearings, supra note 54, at 1 (testimony of 
Attorney General Humphrey) ("[H]ow do we protect the public 
from some of the most dangerous criminals in society?"). 
134 For example, in Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d 609, a sex 
offender commitment case in which I was involved as a defense 
lawyer, the State's attorneys tried the case without mentioning 
the Pearson "utter lack of power to control" standard. The 
State's chief attorney was a criminal prosecutor whose theory of 
the case was that Linehan was a hardened, remorseless criminal. 
Part of the State's case was devoted to showing that Linehan 
had apparently engaged in prior planning of his sexual offenses, 
and had not acted impulsively. This was hardly a theory 
designed to demonstrate an "utter lac;:k of power to control." 
The prosecutor's trial theory initially proved successful, and the 
trial court committed Linehan. The initial order committing 
Linehan contained no reference to the Pearson standard; the 
final order mentioned the standard in only a conclusory fashion. 
Id. at 614. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. Linehan, 
503 N.W.2d 142. The commitment was reversed by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court precisely because the State had not 
proved the "utter lack of power to control" element. See 
Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 619; see also Blakey, supra note 62, 
at 259-64. 
135 See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. 739. This case gave strong 
hope to proponents of a '1urisprudence of prevention" that 
would allow preventive detention based on dangerousness 
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alone. See Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of 
Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense Against 
Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (1989). 
In this doctrinal climate, the State of Louisiana could argue in 
Foucha that dangerousness alone could justify civil 
commitment. See Brief of Respondent, Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71 (1992) (No. 90-5844). In such a climate, the "utter 
lack of power to control" test would indeed seem like archaic 
surplusage. See Janus, supra note 79, at 179. 
136 . See In re Walton, No. C9-92-1749, 1992 WL 383448 
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1992); In re Rickmyer, No. C4-92-
489, 1992 WL 174676 (Minn. Ct. App. July 28, 1992); In re 
Nicolaison, No. CI-92-613, 1992 WL 160843 (Minn. Ct. App. 
July 14, 1992); In re Reeves, No. C5-91-1589, 1991 WL 
271528 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1991); In re Hubbard, No. C9-
91-1031,1991 WL 191651 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1991); In re 
Devillion, No. C8-91-1070, 1991 WL 191653 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 1, 1991); In re Thomas, No. C2-90-1863, 1990 WL 
204264 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1990); In re Martenies, No. 
CX-94-90-1545, 1990 WL 152685 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 
1990). 
137 See in re Hendrickson, No. C6-92-1790, 1992 WL 
383446, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 29, 1992); In re Holly, No. 
C9-92-1055, 1992 WL 238360, at *2 (Minn. App. Sept. 29, 
1992»; In re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d at 642. 
138 See, e.g., In re Fitzpatrick, No. C6-94-255, 1994 WL 
164218 (Minn. Ct. App. May 3, 1994); In re Sadiki, No. C4-93-
2317, 1994 WL 111336 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 1994); In re 
Buckbalton, No. C2-93-1446, 1994 WL 43870 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Feb. 15, 1994); In re Rickmyer, No. CX-93 1446, 1993 
WL 480177 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1993); In re Benson, No. 
CO-93-1357, 1993 WL 459840 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1993); 
In re Sabo, No. C6-93-1329, 1993 WL 366718 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Sept. 21, 1993); In re Sadiki, No. C3-93-1045, 1993 WL 
355906 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993). 
139 Through this period of time, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals reversed two sex offender commitments. In re 
Rodriguez, 506 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. ct. App. 1993); In re 
Stilinovich, 479 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). In both, 
the basis for reversal was that the individual posed a type of 
harm that was outside of the scope of the state's sex offender 
commitment law. 
The "utter lack of power to control" test was the basis for 
several trial court decisions dismissing sex offender 
commitment petitions. In In re Kotowski, No. P5-93-0037 
(Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Minn. Sept. 3, 1993), the trial court 
denied a petition to commit on the grounds that the "utter lack 
of power to control" standard had not been proved. The court 
cited with approval the testimony of one psychologist who 
testified that Kotowski "is able to choose whether or not to act 
in a particular manner. He has a conscious ability to control 
himself." The court concluded: "If society needs protection 
from his behavior, he should be in prison ifhe commits criminal 
acts." 
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See also In re Greene, No. P8-92-13161 (Dist. Ct., Anoka 
County, Minn. July 8, 1993) (Pearson standard requires (1) 
"high threshold regarding frequency and type of sexual 
misconduct and markedly deficient controls"; and (2) a "lack of 
habitual and repeated misconduct" in the respondent). 
140 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 920 (Wahl, 1., 
dissenting) ("It is troubling that since the Minnesota statute 
went into effect in 1939, it has been arbitrarily and 
inconsistently enforced despite the limiting construction in 
Pearson."). 
141 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915 ("The fact that the 
statute has been misapplied on occasion is not a valid criticism 
of the statute itself. The remedy for misapplication is not to 
declare the statute unconstitutional but to appeal erroneous 
decisions and get them reversed. More pertinent to the facial 
challenge to the statute are the cases where the statute has been 
properly applied.") (footnotes omitted). 
This exchange was foreshadowed by Sas, 334 F.2d at 514, 
516 (noting that the statute was "carefully drawn to conform to 
the [Pearson] definition," and therefore not facially 
unconstitutional, but "may be fraught with the possibility of 
abuse in that if not administered in the spirit in which it is 
conceived it can become a mere device for warehousing the 
obnoxious and antisocial elements of society"). 
142 518 N.W.2d 609. On the same day, the court also 
reversed the commitment of Rickmyer. In re Rickmyer, 519 
N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1994). The court held that the conduct of 
Rickmyer, who was a non-violent pedophile, did not meet the 
dangerousness threshold for a sex offender commitment. Id. at 
190. 
143 MSH Fax, supra note 128 (indicating 371 individuals 
"admitted" to state hospital under psychopathic personality 
law); deFiebre, supra note 131 (indicating that 314 persons 
were committed during the same time period). 
144 See Linehan I, 518 N. W.2d at 610. 
145 See, e.g., Paul Gustafson & Robert Whereatt, 
Rapist/Murderer Wins Release - And Tight Surveillance, MINN. 
STAR-TRIB., Aug. 16, 1994, at lA; Donna Halvorsen, Task 
Force Agrees on Bill to Control Sexual Predators, MINN. STAR-
TRIB., Aug. 20, 1994, at lA; Amy Kuebelbeck, House Speaker 
Wants Special Session to Avert Freeing Sexual Predators, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 9, 1994, at 3E; Robert Whereatt, 
Laws Proposed to Keep Sex Predators Off Streets, MINN. STAR-
TRIB., Aug. 12, 1994, at lA. 
146 Panel Blasts Court Decision to Free Sex Offenders, MINN. 
STAR-TRIB., July 15, 1994, at 5B (quoting Rep. Dave Bishop, 
R-Rochester, Minn.). 
147 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 636, art. 8, § 20. 
148 See Panel Blasts Court Decision to Free Sex Offenders, 
98 
supra note 146; Kuebelbeck, supra note 145; Whereatt, supra 
note 145. 
149 Hearings, supra note 54, at 1 (testimony of Attorney 
General Humphrey). 
150 Id. 
151 See Kirwin, supra note 3, at 23-24. 
152 See Gustafson & Whereatt, supra note 146, at lA; Lisa G. 
Lednicer & Tim Nelson, Linehan Release, ST. PAUL PIONEER 
PREss, Aug. 16, 1994, at lA. 
153 Conrad deFiebre, Linehan Recommitment Trial Ends,-
Judge to Rule in May, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Mar. 3, 1995, 
at IB; Conrad deFiebre, Violation Ruled Insufficient for 
Linehan Imprisonment, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., June 1, 1995, 
at 2B. 
154 See Mimi Hall, A Furor Brews Over Release of Sex 
Offenders, USA TODAY, Aug. 17, 1994, at 3A; Molesters 
Reassigned Amid Furor, Minnesota Court Limits 
Hospitalization of Sex Offenders, CmcAGO TRIB., Aug. 17, 
1994, at 16; Neighbors Angry as Sex Killer Secretly Enters 
Halfway House, ARIz. REpUBLIC, Aug. 17, 1994, at A3; Sex 
Offender's Release Has Minn. Governor Scurrying to Tighten 
Law, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 1994, at lOA. 
155 Good Morning America (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 
23, 1994). 
156 1994 Minn. Laws, 1st. Spec. Sess., ch. 1. 
157 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.02, subd. 18b ("[I]t is not 
necessary [for purposes of the SDP Act] to prove that the person 
has an inability to control the person's sexual impulses.") 
158 See Hearings, supra note 54, at 3 (testimony of Attorney 
General Humphrey) ("One of our concerns is that any new 
statute we come up with may be subject to a constitutional 
challenge. No matter how carefully we design this statute, we 
can never be sure that the courts will uphold its validity."). 
159 See Our Perspective: Linehan's Lament, MINN. STAR-
TRIB., Aug. 30, 1994, at 8A (supporting new law); New Law 
Endangers Constitutional Rights, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 
18, 1995, at 8A (opposing new law); Loophole-Closing a 
Mistake, DULUTIINEWS-TRIB., Sept. 2, 1994, at 7A (opposing). 
160 See Kirwin, supra note 3, at 25. 
161 House of Representatives, State of Minnesota, Special 
Session of the Seventy-Eighth Legislature, 7 JOURNAL OF THE 
HOUSE OF REpRESENTATIVES 8821, 8823 (1994); Senate, State of 
Minnesota, Special Session of the Seventy-Eighth Legislature, 5 
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 1, 8 (1994). 
162 See Donna Halvorsen & Robert Whereatt, Sexual 
Predator Bill Ok'd, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Sept. 1, 1994, at lA. 
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163 After five weeks of trial, the district court committed 
Linehan as a Sexually Dangerous Person. In re Linehan, No. 
P8-94-0382 (Dist Ct., Ramsey County, Minn. 1995). Linehan 
appealed. His commitment was affirmed by the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals. In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 313 
[Linehan 11]. In December 1996, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that the SDP Act is constitutional as applied 
to Linehan. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1996); 557 
N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996). 
164 See Stephen J. Huot, Screening and Reforral by the 
Department of Corrections, in PSYCHOPATffiC PERSONALITIES 
AND SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS (1995). 
165 See Donald J. Giese, Iversen Slay Suspect Named, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PREss, July 29, 1965, at AI; Donald J. Giese, 
Linehan Signs Statement, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, July 30, 
1965, at AI; Donald J. Giese, Linehan Confosses Slaying, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PREss, July 31,1965, at AI. 
166 See Morse, supra note 82, at 166, where it is observed 
that: 
No consensus about involuntariness exists among 
"experts" or laypeople. Although many forensic 
psychiatrists and psychologists (and lawyers) 
assume that they possess a good account of 
involuntariness and of so-called pathologies of the 
will and volition, no satisfactory and surely no 
uncontroversial account of any of these topics exists 
in the psychiatric, psychological, philosophical, or 
legal literatures. 
167 In re Crocker, No. CO-95-2500, 1996 WL 192974 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1996); Call v. Gomez, No. C6-95-2470, 1996 
WL 162466 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1996); In re Mattson, No. 
C8-95-2423, 1996 WL 167638 (Minn. Ct. App Apr. 9, 1996); 
In re Edstrom, No. C2-95-2448, 1996 WL 132141 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Mar. 26,1996); In re Mentzos, No. C3-95-2331, 1996 WL 
81721 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1996); In re Hart, No. C9-95-
2057, 1996 WL 56504 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996); Kruger v. 
Comm'r of Human Servs., No. C4-95-1866, 1996 WL 5786 
(Minn. Ct App. Jan. 9, 1996); In re Kunshier, No. C7-95-1490, 
1995 WL 687692 (Minn. Ct App. Nov. 21, 1995); In re 
Patterson, No. C3-95-935, 1995 WL 550098 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Sept 19, 1995); In re Adolphson, No. 1995 WL 434386 (Minn. 
Ct. App. July 25, 1995); In re Mattson, No. C5-95-452, 1995 
WL 365374 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 1995); In re Pirkl, 531 
N.W.2d 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); In re Sadiki, No. C7-95-
419, 1995 WL 311799 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 1995); In re 
Toulou, No. CO-94-2518, 1995 WL 265071 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 9, 1995); In re Mayfield, No. C2-95-103, 1995 WL 
254407 (Minn. Ct. App. May 2, 1995); In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 
366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); In re Young, No. CI-94-1779, 1994 
WL 654508 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1994); In re Patterson, 
No. CO-94-1367, 1994 WL 615035 (Minn. Ct App. Nov. 8, 
1994); In re Mayfield, No. C8-94-1407, 1994 WL 593885 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1994); In re Toulou, No. C9-94-993, 
1994 WL 593907 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1994); In re 
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Fitzpatrick, No. CI-94-1409, 1994 WL 586962 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 25, 1994); In re Kunshier, 521 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994); In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994); In re Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994); In re Holly, No. C9-94-492, 1994 WL 396314 
(Minn. Ct App. Aug. 2,1994). 
168 In In re Blodgett the Minnesota Supreme Court set forth 
factors that courts should use in evaluating the "utter lack of 
power to control" standard: 
In applying the Pearson test, the court considers the 
nature and frequency of the sexual assaults, the 
degree of violence involved, the relationship (or 
lack thereof) between the offender and the victims, 
the offender's attitude and mood, the offender'S 
medical and family history, the results of 
psychological and psychiatric testing and 
evaluation, and such other factors that bear on the 
predatory sex impulse and the lack of power to 
control it. 
510 N.W.2d at 915. But these factors, though they may well be 
relevant, give no instruction about how to distinguish lack of 
capacity to control from failure to control. See SCHOPP, supra 
note 71, at 188 (criticizing Blodgett factors as being irrelevant to 
volitional dysfunction). 
169 See In re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d at 642-46. 
170 See In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d at 530 (affirming 
commitment although "the [pedophilic] 'grooming' process 
requires time, thus eliminating any 'suddenness' regarding the 
sexual activity"); In re Mayfield, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 602, 
at *8 (approving of expert testimony "explaining how planning 
could occur even when the person had an utter lack of control 
over his sexual impulses"); In re Young, 1994 Minn. App. 
LEXIS 1159, at *6 ("[W]hile Young may show planning and 
premeditation by his grooming behavior, his behavior is 
nonetheless impulsive and without volitional control."). 
171 In In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d at 375, the court approved of 
testimony indicating that: 
[A]n important factor in determining whether one 
has power to control sexual impulses is whether the 
person feels he has a problem; if so, he at least has 
some control since he knows he is flawed, and may 
be more vigilant in seeking assistance. . .. Without 
this basic insight, appellant has the utter lack of 
control required by Pearson. 
See also In re Fitzpatrick, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1029, at *3 
(Fitzpatrick "habitually shifts blame for his actions to others ... 
[and] fails to appreciate the consequences of his actions"); In re 
Adolphson, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 965, at *10 ("Appellant's 
actions show he has no will to stop sexually assaulting 
adolescent males. Although appellant is aware that his conduct 
is against the law, he shows no remorse and expresses no second 
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thoughts.") 
172 In re Toulou, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1067, at *9. 
173 See In re Holly, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 715, at *5 
(noting that "[e]ven while at the security hospital, [Holly] has 
'mooned' a female staff person ... and made inappropriate 
sexual comments to another female staff person," and 
concluding that Holly could not control his sexual impulses). 
174 See In re Toulou, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 623, at *7 
(citing trial court finding "that Toulou is 'totally dependent on 
external forces to conform to society's mores,' and that a 
'removal of those external controls, however, will predictably 
result in [Toulou] acting on his impulses."'). 
175 In re Kunshier, 521 N.W.2d at 882 (reciting expert 
testimony that "[Kunshier's] impulse to rape becomes all 
intrusive[,]" and that his "behavior was usually 'impulse driven 
past any point of rational control or concern regarding negative 
impact upon victims or the risk of incarceration. "') 
176 In re Adolphson, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 965. 
177 Id. at * 10 ("Appellant's actions show he has no will to 
stop sexually assaulting adolescent males."); In re Holly, 1994 
Minn. App. LEXIS 715, at *5 ("continued preoccupation with 
sexual gratification and his constant desire to attain this 
gratification at whatever cost"). 
178 In re Mattson, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 805, at *6 
("[W]hen a person engages in behavior despite repeated 
consequences, it evidences a lack of control"). 
179 In re Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d at 450 (distinguishing 
"plotting, planning, seductions, payments, and coercive 
behavior ... from [an] impulsive lack of control"). 
180 In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d at 530; In re Mayfield, 
1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 602, at *8; In re Young, 1994 Minn. 
App. LEXIS 1159, at *6. 
181 No. C3-95-2331, 1996 WL 81721 at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Feb. 27, 1996). 
182 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915. 
183 In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 540 (1968) (concurring 
opinion), Justice Black said: 
When we say that appellant's [conduct] is caused 
not by "his own" volition but rather by some other 
force, we are clearly thinking of a force that is 
nevertheless "his" except in some special sense. 
The accused undoubtedly commits the proscribed 
act and the only question is whether the act can be 
attributed to a part of "his" personality that should 
not be regarded as criminally responsible. 
184 MILLON, supra note 30, at 181-215. 
100 
185 Compare this description with that given by Gene G. Abel 
& Joanne L. Rouleau, The Nature and Extent of Sexual Assault, 
in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 9, 18 (William L. Marshall 
et al. eds., 1990): 
[M]any individuals report having recurrent, 
repetitive, and compulsive urges and fantasies to 
commit rapes. These offenders attempt to control 
their urges, but the urges eventually become so 
strong that they act upon them, commit rapes, and 
then feel guilty afterwards with a temporary 
reduction of urges, only to have the cycle repeat 
again. 
186 See Morse, supra note 82, at 170-74 (arguing that 
volitional impairment arises where the individual suffers a 
"desire or craving ... so intense that the fear of the pain of not 
satisfying it was the true motive for offending"). 
187 Schopp writes that volition is "an exercise of the faculty 
or function by which one engages in conscious and intentional 
action as a result of decision or choice through deliberation. A 
volitional impairment would involve some disorder of the 
capacities by which one engages in conscious and intentional 
action in response to deliberation and choice." SCHOPP, supra 
note 71, at 202 (claiming that "severe cognitive 
psychopathology" is the basis for volitional impairment). 
188 See Morse, supra note 82, at 177 (asserting that the 
cognitive/rationality functions are more easily assessed than the 
"strength of another's desires and dysphoria or fear ofit. "). 
189 See, e.g., Halleck, supra note 71, at 338-53; Seymour L. 
Halleck et a\., The Use of Psychiatric Diagnoses in the Legal 
Process: Task Force Report to the American Psychiatric 
Association, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 481, 494 
(1992); cf Morse, supra note 82, at 177. 
190 See Morse, supra note 82, at 177; Halleck, supra note 71, 
at 338-53 (discussing the setting of threshold levels). 
191 In re Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d at 450. 
192 Lawrence Z. Freedman, Psychoanalysis, Delinquency, and 
the Law, in By REASON OF INSANITY 81, 85 (Lawrence Z. 
Freedman ed., 1983). 
193 See Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. PHIL. 205, 217-19 
(1975) (drawing distinction between the "lower" desires, drives, 
and impulses, and the "higher" faculties of rationality, 
deliberation, and planning). 
194 521 N.W.2d 880 (remanded for further findings on the 
issue of "utter lack of power to control"). 
195Id. at 882. 
196 In re Hart, 1996 WL 56504, at *7. 
197 In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d at 530; In re Mayfield, 
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1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 602, at *8. 
198 Thus, the following passage from the opinion: 
[A]n important factor in determining whether one 
has power to control sexual impulses is whether the 
person feels he has a problem; if so, he at least has 
some control since he knows he is flawed, and may 
be more vigilant in seeking assistance .... Without 
this basic insight, appellant has the utter lack of 
control required by Pearson. 
In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d at 375; see also In re Adolphson, 1995 
Minn. App. LEXIS 965. 
There is no suggestion in either Adolphson or Irwin that the 
beliefs or desires were so irrational, as opposed to illegal and 
immoral, that they would satisfy a cognitive based theory of 
criminal irresponsibility. See Morse, supra note 82. 
199 See MaLON, supra note 30, at 11. 
200 In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d at 375; In re Adolphson, 1995 
Minn. App. LEXIS 965. 
201 See Morse, supra note 82, at 175 ("We are all in large 
measure the product of biological endowments and 
environments over which we had no control, and many of our 
central desires are firmly established well before we reach the 
age of genuine, independent moral reflection on those desires."). 
202 Charles M. Culver & Bernard Gert, Volitional 
Disabilities, in PmLOSOPHY oFMEorcINE 111, 119 (1982). 
203 Halleck et aI., supra note 189, at 495. 
This is a variant of the "policeman-at-the-elbow" test for an 
"irresistible impulse." See Lawrence Z. Freedman, -Psychiatry 
and the Law: An Overview, in By REASON OF INSANITY, supra 
note 192, at 117, 126 (criticizing the test and quoting an Ontario 
judge: "We shall dangle a rope in front of you and see whether 
your impulses are irresistible .... "). 
204 As Morse, supra note 82, at 179, observes: 
Those who offend in the face of certain capture have 
either rationally decided for political or other 
reasons that the offense is worth the punishment, as 
in cases of civil disobedience, or they are irrational. 
We generally tend to conclude that intense internal 
coercion was operative if conduct was so irrational 
that we can't make any sense of it; otherwise, why 
would the person do it? 
205 See Pratt, supra note 126, at 34 ("'The dangerous' have 
always found themselves in a juridical position between the 
sane and the insane; not sane enough to stop breaking the law, 
not insane enough to satisfy the legal requirements for this 
defense.") (quoting John Pratt, Dangerousness. Risk and 
Technologies of Power, 28 AUSlL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 
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(1995)). 
206 DANIEL C. DENNEIT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF 
FREEWILL WORllIWANTING 133 (1983). 
207 Similarly, in In re Sabo, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 947, at 
*3, Sabo "received numerous discipline violations for drug use 
and smuggling, verbal abuse, and threatening others," which 
supported a finding that he was unable to control his sexual 
impulses. See also In re Holly, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 715, at 
*5; In re Mattson," 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 805, at *6 (citing 
with approval expert testimony that "utter lack of control was 
demonstrated by the fact that even when appellant was in a 
structured setting, he had difficulty refraining from the use of 
pornography"); In re Fitzpatrick, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 
1029, at *4 (lack of control demonstrated by "recent 
inappropriate behavior while incarcerated"); In re Patterson, 
1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1199, at *8 (offenses committed 
"despite negative consequences" also supports a finding of 
"utter lack of power to control"). 
208 In re Kunshier, 1995 WL 687692, at *3. 
209 More specifically: 
The trial court cited testimony that Toulou was like 
a wild, predatory animal, which will strike when it 
is hungry and when prey is available unless deterred 
by other larger predators. The court found that 
Toulou is "totally dependent on external forces to 
conform to society's mores," and that a "removal of 
those external controls, however, will predictably 
result in [Toulou] acting on his impulses." 
In re Toulou, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 623, at *7. 
210 In re Mayfield, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 602, at *4-5 
(emphasis added). 
211 In re Young, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1159, at *6 
(emphasis added). 
212 In re Patterson, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1094, at *6 
(emphasis added). 
213 In re Patterson, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1199, at *8 
(emphasis added). 
214 In re Biegenowski, 520 N.W.2d at 527 (emphasis added). 
215 See Morse, supra note 82, at 178 (criticizing R. Rogers, 
APA's Position on the Insanity Defense: Empiricism versus 
Emotionalism, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 840 (1987), for "beg[ging] the 
question" by defining an assessment of volitional capacity in 
terms of "loss of control"). 
216 See Morse, supra note 82, at 177 ("[F]amously, we cannot 
distinguish between irresistible impulses and those impulses 
simply not resisted."). 
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217 See Young v. Weston, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS; In re 
Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129. 
218 This was the path advocated by the State of Louisiana in 
Foucha v. Louisiana. See Brief of Respondent at 9-12, Foucha 
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (No. 90-5844). It was rejected 
by the Supreme Court. See Janus, supra note 79, at 170-77. 
219 See ARGYRlS & SCHON, supra note 40, at xiii, ix (espoused 
theories are those explanations to which the agent gives its 
allegiance). 
220 Id. at 80. 
221 Id. at 81. 
222 "The chief asset of the legal system is its legitimacy." 
Charles Kester, The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science 
and the Troubles of Translation Defining the Proper Role for 
Scientific Evidence of Causation, 74 NEB. L. REv. 529, 563 
(1995) (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLmCAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 56, 
129-70 (1980». 
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